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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Food security is vital for the further development of a state. The aim of this thesis 
is to examine how and why Malawi managed to obtain national food security 
despite being one of the poorest countries in the world. Malawi‟s economy is 
predominantly agricultural based and the majority of its population live in rural 
areas and are employed in agriculture. Therefore, politicians who wish to gain 
support are to target and improve agricultural policies. This is what the 
government in Malawi has done and President Bingu wa Mutharika especially did 
when he was elected President in 2004 by implementing the fertiliser subsidy 
programme. Subsidising fertilisers for poor farmers consequently made the 
agricultural production increase so much so that the country now is food secure 
and is even exporting to neighbouring countries. Political tension exists in the 
country between the President and his opponent, and in order for the President to 
increase his support from the people and to maintain his position and power for 
the upcoming election he needs to satisfy the Malawian people.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Food Security, Malawi, Rational Choice, Subsidies, Agriculture 
Characters: 127 103 
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Executive Summary  
 
This thesis will consider the issue of food security with especially focusing on 
Malawi. The reason for choosing Malawi as a case study is because it is a 
landlocked, extremely poor country in Southern Africa, who despite of this, has 
managed to become food secure in the latest years.  The two questions that will be 
posed are; How has Malawi managed to become food secure? and Why did 
Malawi attain food security? It is mainly national food security that will be 
looked at and the underlying causes to it.  
 
The approach of rational choice will be used in order to explain the behaviour of 
the politicians in Malawi, especially the behaviour of the current President Bingu 
wa Mutharika. Rational choice theory posits that politicians implement, support 
and accept policies in order to gain support from the public so that they (the 
politicians) can maintain and/or increase their power. Rational choice theory also 
exclaims that politicians favour more power than less, and also have a preference 
to stay in office instead of being voted out. Malawi‟s economy is mainly 
agriculturally based, the majority of its population live in rural areas and are 
involved in agriculture, it is therefore necessary for politicians who wish to 
maintain office and power to address the agricultural sector. This is what 
President Mutharika and this government has done by implementing the fertiliser 
subsidy programme which has resulted in an immense increase in the production 
of food.  
 
The thesis is a case study of Malawi, even though there are certain disadvantages 
with conducting a case study, such as not being able to generalise as much as 
when researching many cases, I chose to go through with a case study. This 
because it gives the researcher, in this case me, the opportunity to go more into 
depth into the case instead of only touching upon the surface of many different 
cases.  
 
Food security is a multi faceted concept with no single definition which can be 
applied to it. The author of this thesis has decided to focus on national food 
security instead of household food security. There are several components that can 
be included into the concept and they include; availability of food, accessibility 
and affordability of food, stability in the national system of food supply and food 
quality and safety. There are many reasons for a country to experience food 
insecurity including inadequate employment opportunities, lack of proper 
infrastructure, policies that disregard the agricultural sector, poverty and 
HIV/AIDS. The effect of HIV/AIDS on food security will not be discussed in this 
thesis since it is such a large topic which deserves a thesis of its own.  
 
Malawi is a small, land-locked country in Southern Africa with a population of 12 
million. It gained independence in 1964 and has since struggled with food 
security. The economy of Malawi is moderately small and mainly based on 
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agriculture, which employs around 85 percent of the population. The majority of 
the agricultural production is produced by poor smallholder farmers who rely on 
the rains for good harvests. The reasons for the food insecure environment in 
Malawi are many and include low agricultural productivity, severe poverty, poor 
infrastructure, HIV/AIDS, etc. This thesis mainly focuses on how the country 
solved the problem of low agricultural productivity.  
 
Malawi has experienced several food crises since 2000, the latest occurring in 
2005. After this devastating crisis, President Mutharika decided to, despite 
opposition from donors, to implement a subsidy programme for fertilisers and 
seeds to poor farmers. Malawi has had fertiliser subsidy programmes for some 
years such as the Starter Pack and the Targeted Input Programme, however, it 
wasn‟t until President Mutharika who came into power in 2004, implemented the 
Fertiliser Subsidy Programme in the 2005/2006 growing season that agricultural 
production started to increase significantly to affect the national food security 
situation. Several donors were at first sceptical towards the programme however, 
President Mutharika decided to go through with it anyway. The programme uses 
coupons which poor farmers can exchange for seeds or fertilisers at different 
locations. The distribution system has been criticised since it employs local chiefs 
which have been accused of selling coupons to those who are not in need of them. 
Also, the opposition has accused the government of targeting and favouring the 
people who are supporters of the ruling party and President Mutharika.  
 
The political situation in Malawi since the last election in 2004 has been rather 
tense because of the Bingu wa Mutharika leaving the party (the United 
Democratic Front (UDF)) which helped him to presidency and forming his own 
party the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Many senior members of the UDF 
decided to go with Mutharika and joined the DPP. This angered members and the 
leader of the UDF. The power struggle between the two can be one of the reasons 
for President Mutharika‟s eagerness to satisfy the people of Malawi in order to 
gain and uphold support for his government. This goes in line with what the 
rational-choice theory posits that people naturally favour more power than less, 
and to stay in office rather than being defeated in an election. The programme is 
also one of the main items in the country‟s national budget, therefore it is also 
vital for the government that the programme is a success. 
 
Because of the success of the fertiliser subsidy programme implemented by 
President Mutharika, the country now is an exporter of maize to neighbouring 
countries. This means that the country finally achieved national food security. 
Though, the lack of agricultural research and poor infrastructure reduces the 
programme‟s effectiveness. These two issues need to be addressed. The 
transferability of the programme to other countries needs to be taken with caution 
since every country is unique.  
To sum up, the thesis argues that Malawi attained national food security since 
President Mutharika wants to maintain power therefore he implemented the 
subsidy programme, in order to attain support.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The Subject of the Study 
 
Even though most national plans for development over the past decades have 
contained nutritional consideration, they have usually been outlined as an 
outcome of economic growth. This view is now being contested with a vast body 
of evidence pointing out that even though economic development enhanced 
nutrition outcomes, it regularly occurs at a slow pace and that direct declines in 
income poverty does not necessarily mean comparative decreases in malnutrition. 
To rephrase this into one sentence, economic growth and income security does not 
always guarantee food security. National food security is very important since 
having a population that is malnourished can impede the economic development. 
Therefore governments need to incorporate food security into their policies if they 
wish to obtain sustainable economic growth (Meerman 2008:1). The issue and 
concept of food security will be discussed more in detail later on in the thesis. 
The latest increases in international fertiliser and food prices have highlighted the 
vulnerability of the poor households in developing countries, particularly in 
Africa. The different factors which produced this increase have regenerated the 
focus of policymakers on the necessity to enhance the productivity of staple food 
crops. Over the past decade both the positives and negatives of input subsidies 
have been fiercely debated. The introduction, or re-introduction, of input subsidies 
is occurring in numerous countries in order to obtain short-term food security at 
the same time long-term investments are being instigated to increase productivity. 
However, the price of fertiliser will most likely in the short to medium term 
continue to be high, and subsidies for fertilisers will unavoidably entail an 
elevated budgetary load. The challenge for countries wanting to implement input 
subsidies is how to draw up a so-called „smart‟ input subsidy programme. The 
„smart‟ input subsidy programme would have a considerable impact on food 
availability in the short term, while also for the long term strategy encourage rural 
development and growth and enhance (or at least not hold back) effective demand 
for and commercial distribution of inputs (Dorward et al. 2008:1).  
Malawi is a small landlocked country in Southern Africa considered a least 
developed, low-income and food-deficit country, with the majority of the 
population living below the poverty line, according to the United Nations World 
Food Programme (WFP 2009). It has an estimated population of 12 million. The 
poverty rate differs within the country but it is extensive and severe with around 
65 percent living below the national poverty line and 28 percent in extreme 
poverty (Menon 2007:1). In the densely populated south, the holdings of land are 
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small which leads to encroachment on marginal land and enhanced erosion. These 
circumstances, in addition to the high occurrence of HIV/AIDS (estimated at 12 
percent of the total population), makes the poor extremely susceptible to the 
effects of food insecurity. Roughly half of all children under five are chronically 
malnourished (WFP, Country overview, 2009). The author of this thesis 
understands that HIV/AIDS does have an immense impact on the country, but has 
chosen not to look at the issue in more detail since it would require a thesis of its 
own on solely that topic.  
 
In 2005 (the latest data available), Malawi was ranked 164
th
 out of 177 on the 
United Nations Human Development Index, which measures three dimensions of 
human development (life expectancy, adult literacy and enrolment at primary, 
secondary and tertiary level and purchasing power parity income), as an 
alternative to only using the Gross Domestic Product as an indicator (Human 
Development Report, 2007/2008, Malawi).  
 
According to the Second Integrated Household Survey conducted in 2005 by the 
National Statistics Office of Malawi, it is the most densely populated country in 
Southern Africa even if around 88% of its population lives in rural areas. The 
country has only one rainy and one harvest season. Since Malawi is landlocked 
and the infrastructure remains underdeveloped, importing food is difficult and 
costly. Approximately 2.8 million households rely on smallholder farming, who 
generally only have a small plot of land. Because of extensive poverty not many 
of these farmers have enough money to invest in agricultural inputs. Some 40-
60% of rural households struggle to attain food for about five months each year 
before the harvest in spring (Africa Research Institute 2007).   
 
Malawi suffered from a devastating drought in 2005 which resulted in almost five 
million of its 13 million inhabitants requiring emergency food aid. In 2007, the 
tables had turned and the country was selling the most corn out of all southern 
countries in Africa to the United Nations World Food Program (New York 
Times).  According to the United Nations, the voucher programme for fertilisers 
and seeds has assisted Malawi in doubling its agricultural productivity, making 
the country a net food exporter after having suffered decades of famine as a 
recurrent food importer. To be self sufficient in food Malawi must have 2.2 
million tons of maize per year. In 2005, before the subsidy programme 
commenced, the harvest fell to 1.2 million tons of maize, though after the 
National Input Subsidy Programme was put into place, in 2007, the harvest 
increased to 3.2 million tons of maize, according to the Ministry of Agriculture 
(UN, 2008)  
 
The occurrence of severe child hunger has also decreased sharply. The success 
was due to new subsidies for fertilisers. The World Bank and several other highly 
developed countries that have been sending aid to Malawi have over the last 20 
years pushed Malawi to abide by free market policies, which included reducing or 
abolishing the subsidies for fertilisers, this even though both the United States and 
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Europe heavily subsidies their own farmers. After the drought in 2005, the newly 
elected president Bingu wa Mutharika (elected in 2004) chose to do what the west 
practiced, instead of what they advocated and preached. Both the United Nations 
and Britain were both unconvinced since the soil in Malawi is critically depleted 
and most its farmers were too poor to be able to afford fertilisers at market prices. 
Malawi‟s success in subsidising fertilisers has added to the reassessment of the 
vital role of agriculture in reducing poverty, especially in Africa. It has also 
highlighted the fundamental significance of public investments in the basics of a 
farm economy, which are improved seed, educating the farmer, fertiliser, 
agricultural research and credit. The government of Malawi has supported the use 
of fertiliser subsides for an extended length of time. However, they unwillingly 
consented to donor recommendations, which included adhering to private markets 
and an opposition to government intervention. During the 1980s, and in the 1990s, 
Malawi was persuaded by the World Bank to fully abolish fertiliser subsidies. The 
theoretical perspective of this was that the Malawian farmers would then change 
to grow cash crops for export and then use the foreign exchange earnings for food 
import (Dugger 2007:1). 
 
1.1 The Purpose and the Problem of the Study 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the concept of food security and how a nation 
state can achieve this, with special focus on Malawi and how it managed to attain 
national food security. It will examine the fertiliser subsidy programme in Malawi 
which according to me is the reason for its successful food security situation. The 
time focus is mainly the years after the latest election which was in 2004 since it 
is only after this election that the country managed to become food secure. The 
thesis will further look at why it became food secure and the political motives 
behind it, which according to me is that the government wants to maintain power, 
which is clearly in their own interest.  
 
Malawi was chosen for the case study since, as mentioned, it is one of the poorest 
countries in the world, yet they managed to obtain national food security (see 
appendix 1 for map). 
It was also chosen with the intention of providing evidence that it is possible for 
countries in Africa, with the help of government intervention become food secure. 
Though, the motives behind the success are further investigated in the thesis. 
Hence, the research question posed is;  
 
 How has Malawi managed to become food secure? 
 Why did Malawi obtain food security? 
 
The hypothesis for this thesis is that Malawi became food security because of the 
government‟s decision to re-introduce subsidies for fertilisers and seeds in order 
to increase agricultural production. Favourable weather contributed to the success 
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of the subsidy programme, but cannot be seen as the sole cause; hence subsidies 
are necessary for poor farmers. The reason why the government chooses to 
intervene in the agricultural policies and implement the subsidy programme was 
because they seek to maintain power, and act in their own interest.  
 
This thesis has chosen to focus on national food security rather than household 
food security since the author found it more interesting to look at how a nation 
state can provide and guarantee food for its people, because the state has a certain 
responsibility to its citizens. Without food people are not able to be productive 
members of a society, hence, they cannot contribute to the further development of 
the state.  
 
This thesis is an explanatory case study and reviewing literature from a multitude 
of sources including reports, official government document, news papers and 
articles. The main focus in the political aspect of the thesis is the post 2004 
election period, though, a historical background will be provided in order to 
understand the problem.  
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2. Theoretical Overview 
 
2.1 Rational Choice Theory  
 
The rational choice theory was chosen as the main theory for this thesis because I 
personally believe that it is the most appropriate theory when analysing and 
describing the acts and behaviours of politicians, especially in this case.   
 
In order for change to occur, politicians have to initiate, support and accept new 
policies. During the 1980s and 1990s, the support of politicians was crucial to 
policy advocates and officials of international financial institutions who were 
profoundly dedicated to change the policies in developing countries. They often 
discovered that many politicians denied the reform proposals, even if the 
proposals were better than the existing situation. To understand the motivation of 
politicians who resist or support policy change, some political economists have 
turned to economics, and have many times drawn on the rational-choice theory 
(Grindle 2001:348-351).  Rational choice can be divided up into two categories: 
public choice and social choice. In this thesis it is mainly the public choice rather 
than the social choice that is considered when the rational choice approach is 
discussed (Lewin 1988:13).   
 
The approach of rational-choice is that political actors act in order to maximise 
utility, which is generally presumed to mirror their self-interest. Bureaucrats, 
party officials, voters, lobbyists and politicians are thought to be rational in the 
sense that they have preferences and want to realise them through action(Grindle 
2001:348-351).Though it can be applied to any sphere of life, rational choice, or 
“the assumption that the social actor, whether the individual or a collectivity, 
seeks to optimize rational gains within the limits of the objective situation in 
which the actor finds him, her, or itself” (Delanty and Strydom 2003:372), is 
especially relevant for politics. 
 
Rational-choice theorists, when trying to explain the behaviour of politicians, 
usually claim that politicians naturally favour more power than less, prefer to stay 
in office than to be defeated and to be re-elected rather than lose. Naturally voters 
favour politicians who present them with benefits that enhance their welfare to 
those who do not do this. In democratic societies, politicians have to be receptive 
to the interest of voters or certain constituencies that aid them in attaining their 
objectives. In a rational-choice political economy, the interests of voters are vital 
since they confine the available choices and make them take decisions that are 
characteristically geared so that in elections they will be favoured. The unit of 
analysis for explaining political behaviour in the rational-choice approach is the 
individual. However, empirically a lot of political activity includes the behaviour 
of groups. In the rational-choice approach, when two or more individuals 
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concurrently try to act on their preferences, and when it is not possible for them to 
be attained by joint action, there is a conflict (Grindle 2001:348-351). In Malawi, 
rational-choice theory could be used to explain why politicians finally decided to 
subsidize fertilizer, as they thought it was the best way to keep themselves in 
power. This idea will be discussed later on. 
 
Even though rational-choice theory was formulated to describe the actions of 
individuals in the world of politics, it can also be applied to state level behaviour. 
Just as an individual chooses the course of action that he or she deems most 
efficient, so too a government makes decisions based upon pragmatism. In the 
case of the Malawian government, they demonstrated a rational-choice when they 
decided to provide fertilizer subsidies for their people in order to ensure their 
popularity. If the choice had been morally based, there is no question that 
politicians would have starved themselves before allowing their countrymen to go 
hungry. Instead, they were calculating and rational individuals who decided to use 
agricultural policy as a political tool. For these politicians, the costs of the 
fertilizer subsidies – spending a large percentage of the national budget, angering 
many international donors who disagreed with the program – did not outweigh the 
benefits – keeping citizens fed, creating a more content electorate, and exporting 
food to neighbouring countries. 
 
There are several theoretical reasons, according to Robert H. Bates (1983), for the 
way governments act and why they choose to intervene in agricultural policies. 
The three main reasons include governments as agents of the public interest, 
governments as agents for private interests and governments as agencies that seek 
to maintain power. Bates (1983) mainly agrees with the last explanation and 
rejects the two first ones.  
 
2.1.1 Governments as agents of the public interest 
 
This approach, which originates from development economics, views 
governments as agencies whose assignment is to secure the interest of their 
societies by choosing public policies which they believe are socially best.  The 
principal public interest of poor societies is fast economic growth, which is 
reflected in the policy choices of governments in developing countries (Bates 
1983:162-163). This approach is the opposite of rational choice, hence will not be 
used in this thesis, but still briefly outlined here.  
 
According to Bates (1983), the principle that governments act as agents for 
maximising social welfare is not very effective when it comes to food policy. In 
order to assure social objectives, governments can decide between many different 
policy instruments. As an example Bates uses the objective of increasing food 
supply, which is the intention for numerous African governments. To facilitate 
this, governments might offer increased prices for food or invest the same sum of 
resources in food production projects. As maintained by Bates, the former is a 
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more cost-effective way of securing this objective; however, the project-based 
policies are the ones mainly preferred by the African governments. To reinforce 
the inducement for food production, African governments can increase the price 
of agricultural products or subsidise the costs of farm equipment. Either option 
would work, though governments usually prefer to go through with the latter, 
because an increase in agricultural prices would negatively affect poor Malawians 
purchasing food (Bates 1983:163-165).  
 
2.1.2 Governments as Agents of Private Interest 
  
According to Bates (1983:166-168), there are two approaches that reject the 
assumptions that governments can employ good judgement and that they act out 
of a regard for social welfare. The first approach is closely related to dependency 
theory. The dependency school theorists emphasise that governments in the 
„periphery‟ are „weak‟ and that they do not possess autonomy. What they mean is 
that those governments are not capable to defend local interest since economic 
and political ties force them to the interests of the „core‟, i.e. the rich developed 
countries.  
 
The second approach, the pluralist approach, considers public policy as the result 
of political pressures used by members of the domestic economy. For this 
approach, food policy in Africa seems to denote a form of political settlement 
intended to produce peaceful relations between the government and urban 
constituents. Pressure/interest groups are one part of the pluralist model of politics 
and the second main part is competitive elections. In Africa, and also in the case 
of Malawi, the majority of its population living in rural areas and being farm 
families, agricultural policies could not be ignored since parties have to secure 
votes in order to win power, therefore competitive elections are important (Bates 
1983:169-173).  
 
 
2.1.3 Governments as Agencies that Seek to Retain Power  
 
The third approach which Bates argues can explain government behaviour is 
when they act in order to maintain their power.  This is the approach that Bates 
supports the most out of the listed. According to me, it is very similar to the 
rational-choice approach. It explains the low food prices as political pressures. 
With the pressure for low-priced food, it assists in explaining why when 
governments desire more food they have a preference to attain it by building more 
programmes instead of increasing the price. Furthermore, it also explains why 
governments prefer to offer production subsidies as an alternative to increasing 
the price of food with the intention of strengthening food production (Bates 
1983:173). This approach supports the subsidy programmes implemented by the 
government in Malawi. 
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There are three trends which have been pointed out by Bates (1983:174) that 
occur. Firstly, programme and project-based policies do not endure as much from 
this liability explained above. This is since officials can be discreet with the 
location of projects and also with the staff. This in turn lets them present the 
benefits selectively upon those whose political support they need and want. 
Therefore politicians are more likely to favour project based policies as a means 
of rural development.  
 
Secondly, governments and politicians create too many projects, knowing that the 
budgetary resources available might not be that many. The reason for this is 
usually that they want to make certain that officials in each administrative district 
retrieve resources in order to ensure political support. Another trend is to hire a 
workforce that is too large for the project or not skilled enough, consequently 
patronizing the viability of the project (Bates 1983:174-175).  
 
The third and last trend is to have projects that are profitable for politicians 
privately, but socially wasteful. Repeatedly, from an economic stance, agricultural 
projects do not succeed. This is since they do not create enough revenue to cover 
their costs. Even so and with that knowledge, public agencies still implement such 
projects. A key motive for politicians is that they are usually more concerned with 
political expedience than they are with using public resources efficiently 
economically. This is because if a project does not produce a sufficient amount of 
return on the public resources used, but nevertheless benefits and rewards the 
politician (or those who depend/build on it) privately, support will be given. The 
project will operate as a source of reward for the followers (Bates 1983:175-177).  
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3. Method 
3.1 Motivation 
 
This thesis will use the explanatory case-study method. Malawi was chosen as the 
case since it is an exemption of the countries in Africa where so many struggle 
with food security, which Malawi has managed to obtain. However, this thesis 
maintains that it is not the case of food security, but rather what lies behind the 
focus and attainment of becoming food secure which is the larger case. One can 
ask the question, is Malawi one of the countries where the government and 
political leaders seek to stay in power, with food security being the bi-product of 
this in order to attain votes from the people? This will be explored later on in the 
thesis.  
 
3.2 Case Study 
 
Whenever a researcher explores a single case of a phenomenon within a single 
setting, it can be described as a case-study. The single case analysis can, if 
correctly researched and constructed, be used to increase the analytical knowledge 
of political science (Peters 1998:137-148). The explanatory case study method is 
generally preferred when „how‟ and „why‟ questions are being posed, and when 
the researcher does not have much control over events and when the case studied 
is a modern phenomenon (Yin 2003:1-6), as is the case with this thesis. Evidence 
for case studies can be derived from six sources: documents, interviews, archival 
records, participant-observation, physical artefacts and direct observation. 
Moreover, it is important for the researcher to use a multitude of different sources 
(ibid. 2003:83). This thesis mainly uses documents and archival records.  
In order determine the quality of any empirical research, Yin (2003:33-39), 
identifies four tests that can be conducted: 
 
1. Construct validity: by using many different sources of evidence and determine 
a chain of events. This test is often criticised as researchers are seen as subjective 
when collecting data. For this thesis, the different sources of evidence have 
included books, articles, news papers, official government documents, reports etc.  
 
2. Internal validity: conduct explanation-building and deal with rival explanations. 
This test is only a matter of interest if the researcher is trying to discover if one 
event led to the other.  
 
3. External validity: deals with the difficulty of distinguishing whether the 
findings of a study are generalisable further than the case study conducted. Critics 
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often argue that case studies are not generalisable; however, this is not the case 
since they deal with analytical generalisations instead of statistical generalisation 
(see further explanation below).  
 
4. Reliability: the purpose of this test is to be certain that if a later researcher 
wished to do the same case study, he/she would achieve the same findings and 
conclusions. The objective of reliability is to reduce the biases and errors in a 
study.  
 
There are numerous fundamental methodological issues with case-studies. They 
include uncertainties and questions about variance. If only a single case is studied, 
then the experimental variance must be presupposed, instead of observed directly. 
This is due to limitations of money and time etc. This portends that the 
„comparison‟ will be either theoretical standard or with other cases and come later 
on (Peters 1998:142).  
 
3.2.1 Critique 
  
Sir Geoffrey Vickers (1965:173) presents an incisive critique of case studies when 
he states that: “Case histories are a laborious approach to understanding. For 
situations are so varied that even a large number of cases may be a misleading 
sample, while each is so complex that even a detailed description may be too 
summary; and none is comprehensible outside the historical sequence on which it 
grew.” Since the case-study only has the accessibility of only a single case, almost 
each variable has an equal chance of being a cause. With no comparison (with 
other cases or over time), there is no recognised cause, as a kind of face validity, 
that can be utilised to deal with explanations, therefore there is no possibility of 
rejecting causes (Peters 1998:139). 
 
There are concerns over the fact that case studies are viewed as providing little 
basis for scientific generalisation. Even though case studies are not generalisable 
to populations or the universe, they are generalisable to theoretical propositions. 
In this meaning, the case study does not signify a „sample‟, and when conducting 
a case study, the researcher‟s goal is to “expand and generalize theories 
(analytical generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalization).” (Yin 2003:10). In analytical generalisation, the researcher 
attempts to generalise a specific set of results to some broader theory (Yin 
2003:37).  
 
Even though there were some ways in which more variables could be included 
and to evaluate them, any single researcher could only examine a small number of 
them, which most likely would be the ones in which he or she find the most 
interesting. This is because most researchers do not choose a random case, rather 
one that, again, he or she thinks is the most interesting. This preliminary interest 
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and the subjective possibility that follows it, will most likely form the research 
outcomes, even though there will be attempts by the researcher at obtaining 
objectivity (Peters 1998:139).  
 
3.2.2 Advantages 
 
Regardless of the weaknesses of case-study research, there are several advantages 
also. A good case researcher acknowledges and accepts the complexity and 
multiple causation as a central characteristic of their research, rather than as a 
problem that has to be eliminated. A case-study tries to position its finding in its 
individual historical and cultural environment, instead of presuming that political 
events are isolated from their surroundings. As a result of this, the case-study can 
look straight at the series of events that created an outcome, instead of simply the 
outcome. The concentration of case-studies on processes, however, may not 
always be the best source for conducting generalisations (Peters 1998:137-148).  
Agricultural policies and the process behind them are fundamentally driven by 
political forces hence one must take the political economy surrounding them into 
account. The political endurance of governments in primarily agro-based 
economies mainly relies on whether the agricultural policy process is perceived as 
successful in obtaining food security at whatever cost. The government of Malawi 
implemented the fertiliser subsidy programme despite strong donor opposition, 
who not only maintained that the programme contradicted the ongoing economic 
liberalisation efforts, but also that it would not be fiscally sustainable for the 
country in the long-run (Chinsinga 2007:2).  
 
3.3 Delimitations 
  
The influence of HIV/AIDS on food security for the country has been through 
loss of productivity (Cammack et al. 2003:20), and the epidemic also puts a stress 
on household labour entitlements through death and by weakening people living 
with the disease. It also causes a re-division of labour in order to take care of the 
person who is sick or orphaned. It has been argued that food insecurity and the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS are mutually supporting (Charman and Hodge 2007). 
When living in a food insecure environment, one is more likely to be 
malnourished. Research has proven that the risk of HIV/AIDS transmission from 
mothers to children is increased when the mother is malnourished. Hence, this is 
another reason for why the country needs to obtain food security so that the 
epidemic does not increase or hamper the future economic growth and 
productivity of the country (Cammack et al. 2003:20). However, the effects of the 
epidemic will not further be investigated in this thesis.  
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The food security question often becomes a question of food production and 
availability. When the availability issue has been met, then the subject of 
accessibility and entitlements can be tackled (Cammack et al. 2003:8). This thesis 
will focus on the national food production and availability, hence national food 
security, mainly between the years after the latest election (2004 and present) and 
investigate the underlying behaviour of politicians to gain support.  
 
 
17 
 
4. Framework  
4.1 Food Security 
 
Food security is a multifaceted concept which includes problems that exist on 
different levels (global, regional, local, national, household and individual level) 
and in different dimensions. This is obvious in the many definitions that exist, 
making assent on a single definition for food security difficult. Thomas Malthus, 
in his Essay on the Principle of Population from 1798, pronounced an early 
notion of the food security concept: the need to grow enough food to feed the 
word‟s increasing population (Bredahl et al.1999:3-4). 
  
During the 1950s and 1960s, the food security was strongly linked to concepts of 
increasing production. During the early 1970s, the global production of grain 
decreased which resulted in an increase in price. Throughout this period, food 
security was related to the size of grain storages. However, the increase in grain 
storages that followed could not eliminate the hunger disasters, especially not in 
Africa, which caused the issue of accessibility to obtain a central role in the 
understanding of food security. Since the 1980s, the focus has changed from only 
focusing on the amount of food produced to the issue of food security. This was 
especially apparent in 1996 during the World Food Summit, when it was decided 
to halve the number of people starving by 2015 (SOU 2002).  
Before the World Food conference in 1974, the concept of food security was 
mainly related with simply alleviating hunger.  However, after the conference, the 
concept became more complex (Bredahl et al.1999:3-4). Different scholars and 
organisations have contributed with various definitions of their own. The World 
Bank stated in 1986 (p.1), that “Food security is access by all people at all times 
to enough food for an active, healthy life”. 
  
As mentioned, even though there is no single definition of food security, many of 
the definitions overlap. The many different definitions of food security allows for 
the reader of them to interpret them in a flexible, adaptable and open way 
(Bredahl et al. 1999:4). The exact definition of food security has been disputed 
over some time, though the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation‟s 
(FAO) declaration states that ending world hunger is achieved “when all people, 
at all times have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and 
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life” (World Food Summit 1996). The main components of food 
security that have been observed as common in many definitions include (Special 
Programme for Food Security, FAO, 2009) (Guha-Khasnobis et al 2007): 
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i. food availability 
ii. household accessibility to food or affordability 
iii. stability in the national system of food supply 
iv. food quality and safety 
 
The components are all central for food security, but it is important to note that 
they cannot by themselves ensure food security for a population over time.   
 
The World Food Conference in 1974 was held due to the famines of the period 
1972/73 in order to reaffirm the case for increased food production. However, 
there were more famines during the 1980s and in 1986 the World Bank called for 
policies to guarantee food security. This has not been met today and the reasons 
are multiple and complex. Globally, the production of food grain has increased 
faster than the population despite this increased global food production does not in 
itself equate or grant food security in the developing countries. According to 
Barbara Ingham (1995:289), it is not food supply that is of importance, rather the 
accessibility of the population to food supplies. A lack of food might be the result 
of natural disasters such as droughts and floods, civil war and other conflicts 
which can lead to the flow of food being impounded or interrupted and simply not 
having enough purchasing power due to chronic poverty. 
 
The last point is often regarded as chronic food insecurity. The Report of the 
South Commission (1990:84) justifies chronic food insecurity as “a persistent lack 
of economic capacity to grow and buy the minimum essential amounts of food”.  
 
The causes are numerous and may include; 
 
 Inequalities in land ownership and distribution, consequentially leading to 
landlessness 
 Inadequate employment opportunities for both rural and urban poor 
 Not enough investment in basic rural infrastructure 
 Shortage of capital and credit for smallholders 
 Government policies that discriminate against the agricultural sector, 
especially food production 
 Failure of supplying basic social and extension services in rural areas 
 Defective systems for food marketing and distribution 
 
According to Ingham (1995), chronic food insecurity will probably only be solved 
when the agricultural sector is included in the development process and when 
policies for reducing poverty are implemented. However, acute food insecurity, 
which can be a result of natural disasters and civil war, is connected to 
international emergency aid. Though, they may have different causes, chronic and 
acute food insecurity are interlinked. Long-term planning to decrease chronic food 
insecurity will enhance people‟s capacity to endure short-term shocks, such as 
droughts and floods (Ingham 1995:289). 
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The United Nations (UN) and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 
regard satisfactory nutrition as more than simply obtaining enough food. Even 
though someone might have a satisfactory diet, health conditions might be 
inadequate to ensure positive nutrition; for example, intestinal parasites could 
infect someone, which may hinder the effective consumption of the food 
consumed. Due to this, there has been an increased focus of the household food 
security, instead of merely national (and regional) food security. Household food 
security centres around the needs of the poor, since they are the most affected 
within a society when acute food insecurity prevails. Government policies that 
encourage household food security, accentuates the following measures; 
 
 Production of food and non-food crops by smallholders, for own 
consumption and sale at a profit 
 Enhancing post-harvest and slaughter-handling practices to decrease food 
losses 
 To increase incomes and improve the quality of diets, animal husbandry 
should be expanded 
 Reinforcing agricultural research to endorse improved agronomic practices. 
 Giving special support for women as the major producers of home-grown 
food for family consumption 
 Establishing micro-enterprises to make rural areas self-sufficient in food 
(Ingham 1995:290) 
 
Food security can be discussed as both individual and national. The former 
concerns the individual and the family unit and the main determinant is 
purchasing power-income altered for the cost of what that income must buy, 
which means that the rich do not experience food insecurity. It is the poor who 
spend a large part of the income on food who suffer from it. The utmost frequency 
of food insecurity is amongst the absolute poor, who are usually situated in the 
rural areas of developing countries. They are also most commonly small farmers 
or landless rural labourers. The other group most prone to food insecurity are the 
urban poor. Becoming food insecure can have several reasons such as loss of 
income, decrease in crop yields, sharp increase in the price of food etc. 
(Thompson 1983:228-230)  
 
National food security, as defined by Robert L. Thompson (1983), is guaranteeing 
enough food supplies to feed the country‟s population at rational prices, in spite of 
yearly fluctuations in crop yields. However, objective nutritional criteria for 
defining national food security are extremely hard to define. Concerning national 
food security, it is not only individual purchasing power that plays a role but also 
the national purchasing power, unless the country has sufficient reserve stocks 
available. Corresponding to the individual case, national purchasing power is the 
amount of foreign exchange that the country has available in order to pay for food 
imports (Thompson 1983:230-232). As mentioned, this thesis has decided to focus 
on national food security and the agricultural policies associated with it. 
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The responsibility of the state towards its citizens has been discussed for many 
hundreds of years. As early as in the seventeenth century philosophers Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke who both considered the value of politics in their works 
Leviathan and Second Treatise of Government, respectively. The two concur that 
government was originally founded for protection (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philisophy, Hobbes‟s Moral and Political Philosophy 2008 and Locke‟s Political 
Philosophy 2005), which I would consider also including the protection from 
starvation due to the lack of food security. However, the view of Hobbes and 
Locke will not further be discussed in this thesis the point was simply brought up 
in order for the reader to know that the concept of state responsibility has been 
discussed for a long period of time.  
 
Some analysts also add the notion of self-sufficiency to the definition of national 
food security. Self-sufficiency, as maintained by Thompson (1983:230), is when a 
country can produce enough food itself in order to offer some minimum level of 
food intake per person, in order to defend itself against the unforseen event that it 
might be unable to import food at any cost. There are also less extreme versions of 
the definition, some which highlight the benefit and desirability of food 
production being in line with demand. They recognise the country as being food 
insecure when there is a shortfall between domestic consumption and production.  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s the debate around food security evolved and 
acknowledged that national food security does not have to entail individual 
countries becoming self sufficient in food production. Instead, determined by the 
individual country‟s factor endowments, a more profitable and maybe safer 
alternative would be to produce and export manufactured goods or high-value 
crops, and then to buy, from the would market, a proportion of the national staple 
food requirements. However, numerous African governments were critical of this 
since they feared becoming too reliant on the international grain trade, knowing 
that the most food-insecure people are usually smallholder farmers who would not 
be able to afford, nor have access to commercially imported food. The 
governments of these countries maintained a devotion to national self-sufficiency 
and their policies (before they were modified by the structural adjustment 
programmes) embodied pricing depending on what season it was, input subsidies, 
and subsidies for the price of food (Devereux 1997:8).  
 
The development towards food security has not been uniform whatsoever across 
the world. Thirty-five years ago more forty percent of East and Southeast Asians 
did not consume enough calories. From then, about 282 million people have 
become food secure with not only about 10 percent remaining undernourished. 
This success is largely due to the progress in China. The same trend has been 
shown in Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, where 
food security has improved. Of utmost concern are South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In South Asia progress continues, even though it is rather slow. However, 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, the amount of food insecure people almost doubled during 
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the latter third of the twentieth century. According to Graham et al. (2007), this 
number is expected to continue to rise as the population increases. This would 
mean that Sub-Saharan Africa would have the highest incidence of 
undernourishment and more food insecure people than any other region in the 
world (Graham et al. 2007:169). 
 
According to the Swedish Government Official Investigations (Statens Offentliga 
Utredningar (SOU)) (2002), there is a close relation between food security and 
strategies aimed at decreasing poverty and national development. Eliminating 
poverty is necessary in order for poor households to obtain enough food. It is also 
necessary to promote economic growth and trade to ensure food security at a 
national level. This is since poverty causes people to go hungry, but hunger causes 
poverty as well. Studies conducted have shown that for several countries in 
Africa, the economic growth could increase with more than one percent per year if 
malnutrition was eradicated (SOU 2002:16). 
 
The majority of people in developing countries are employed in or living from 
agriculture. However, agriculture‟s contribution to employment is usually larger 
than its contribution to national output, which is an indication of the low 
productivity of the traditional agriculture that exists in developing countries. 
Traditional agriculture means that production systems are mainly directed towards 
own consumption by farming households, or by those in the surrounding area. It is 
also characteristic for traditional agriculture that yields (output per hectare) and 
returns of labour are commonly lower than in commercialised agriculture. The 
production level can also be undependable, which means food shortages and 
starvation can be caused by a poor harvest. This kind of agriculture (traditional) is 
still very important in especially Africa. The low productivity as mentioned can 
be understood as a crucial underlying factor of rural poverty in developing 
countries, according to Ingham (1995:275).  
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4.2 Malawi 
 
In 1964 Malawi gained independence from Britain. The country was then led by 
President Hastings Kamuzu Banda for almost three decades, employing dictatorial 
power through the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Confronted with an economic 
crisis and resilient international and domestic pressure, Banda agreed to a 
referendum consenting multiparty rule in 1993 (Freedom House 2007). 
According to O&M Development Consulting (2003), the majority of studies 
completed in the beginning of the 1990s recognise that Malawi‟s government‟s 
policy goals for food security were focusing on national self-sufficiency in the 
production of food. This would be achieved by enhancing the maize production. 
Even though the growing of maize occurred all through Malawi, the production of 
it did not keep up with the population growth for numerous reasons, which 
resulted in food shortages and forcing the country to import food. The factors that 
affect food insecurity are plentiful depending on the group being contemplated, 
though poverty is constantly recognised as the main underlying factor. Other 
factors acknowledged as affecting food security in Malawi are low levels of 
income, low agricultural productivity and high population growth (O&M 
Development Consulting 2003:26).  
 
In order to fully understand the execution and impacts of the 2006/7 agricultural 
input subsidy programme, it has to be regarded in the context of extensive rural 
poverty and food insecurity, low and uneven agricultural productivity, susceptible 
agriculture-based livelihoods, extreme credit restraints to fertilisers use and an 
established history of smallholder agricultural input subsidies (Dorward et al. 
2008).   
 
For instance, in 2003/4, to be able to purchase a 50kg bag of fertiliser, a poor 
farmer had to pay up to around 10% of his mean per capita annual rural 
expenditure. It is therefore not unforseen that agricultural input subsidies have 
politically and economically been a part of Malawi for many years. During the 
1970s and 1980s, there were general price subsidies on smallholder fertilisers and 
maize seed, together with subsidised credit, a key ingredient of the agricultural 
development policy. The subsidies were removed, but reintroduced again as a 
reaction to shortages of maize, alternating political pressures, low productivity of 
maize and increasing domestic fertiliser prices (Dorward et al. 2008:2).  
 
According to the National Statistics Office of Malawi, poverty is persistent and 
primarily rural with a national poverty head count of 52% in 2004/5, with 94% of 
these people living in the rural areas (National Statistics Office 2005). As can be 
seen from chart 1 on the following page, in 2007 the poverty rate had not declined 
with a stagnant figure of 52% of the population living on less than $136 per year 
and 22% of the population living on less than $84 per year. This means that 74% 
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of the total population would find it extremely difficult to purchase a 100 kg bag 
of fertiliser, which is what they usually come in, for a cost at around $60. 
However, with the subsidies provided by the government, the price of the 100 kg 
bag of fertiliser decreased to only $14 (Africa Research Institute 2007). The chart 
was included to illustrate for the reader how much a poor farmer in Malawi 
spends on fertilisers, with and without subsidies, in comparison to his annual 
income.  
 
Chart 1. Relative Cost in Fertiliser Prices 
 
Source: Africa Research Institute (2007), Making Fertiliser Subsidies Work in Malawi, Briefing 
Note 0703, December 2007, p. 2. 
 
Since there are not many alternative livelihoods to farming, and in combination 
with the small area of land that farmers use, they are forced to cultivate maize on 
the same plot each year. This over-cultivation has caused the fertility of the soil to 
decrease, which consequently leads to poor harvests (Africa Research Institute 
2007). Long-term strategies to enhance the fertility of the soil include land reform 
and improved agricultural management. However, the most effective and fast 
strategy is to use fertilisers. In 2007, the commercial price of fertiliser was $30 for 
50 kg, which is impossible for a poor farm household to pay. Being able to 
retrieve fertilisers has become one of the most vital political issues in Malawi. 
Even though the subsidies are costly and might discourage farmers to diversify, 
there are, according to the Africa Research Institute, no other viable options to 
achieve short-term food security in Malawi. There have been several efforts to 
reduce subsidies in the past, which have often coincided with unfortunate harvest 
and increased food insecurity. In 1987, the Structural Adjustment and stabilisation 
programmes phased out the agricultural subsidies, which then were linked to the 
food crisis. Food shortages in 1997/98 were also linked to the abolishment of 
subsidies in 1996. When, in 2002, the Starter Pack programme was scaled down, 
the country was hit by a severe famine (Africa Research Institute 2007). The 
Starter Pack programme will be explained more in detail later on in the thesis.  
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According to O&M Development Consulting (2003), there is a strong agreement 
that because the economy of Malawi relies so much on agriculture, the 
cornerstone of Malawi‟s development policy should be agricultural policy. The 
main drive of the agricultural policy should, as maintained by O&M Development 
Consulting (2003:22), entail development and growth of agricultural production to 
improve the domestic consumption for the rising population and exports.  
 
Since the 1990s, Malawi has experienced immense political changes. In 1994, the 
country reinstated multiparty democracy after having been one of the most 
repressive one party regimes in the southern region of Africa since independence 
in 1964. It was anticipated that with this transition the country would recover 
economically and social development would be enhanced. However, no matter if 
one measures poverty in terms of gross national product, the UNDP‟s Human 
Development Index (HDI) or its Human Poverty Index, the country still remains 
one of the poorest countries in the world. The Integrated Household Survey (IHS) 
from 2005 estimates that 6.7 million (that is approximately 52.4 percent) out of 
the total population of 12 million live below the poverty line and out of these, 2.2 
million cannot afford to meet the daily recommended food requirements 
(Chinsinga 2007:3). 
 
 
4.3 Food Security in Malawi 
 
Since independence, Malawi‟s approach towards food security has been the 
production of the country‟s staple, maize (Cammack et al. 2003).  Food security 
policy has been prepared for many years by numerous different government 
institutions in Malawi. An assortment of various programmes has been executed 
that are linked with access to food, food agricultural productivity, and related 
issues, though with varying degrees of success (Cammack et al. 2003).  
 
The former Minister of Agriculture stated that “A nation that cannot feed itself 
cannot be a sovereign and independent state. We, in Malawi, must therefore be 
able to feed ourselves by whatever means” (Chinsinga, 2007:15, from ADMARC 
only buying Maize, The Nation, 17
th
 August 2005). This statement was included in 
the thesis to make the reader aware of the standpoint which politicians in Malawi 
have, which according to me, is strongly towards promoting national food 
security.  
 
There are many factors that contribute to the insecure food situation in Malawi. 
They include low agricultural productivity, chronic poverty, badly chosen 
economic policies, poor infrastructure, limited arable land, ecological constraints 
and other social and demographic factors. These factors are not isolated but 
instead are all interrelated. Still, it is broadly accepted that the main cause of food 
insecurity and malnutrition in Malawi is chronic poverty. This means the absence 
of economic opportunities to produce enough safe and nutritious food or to 
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exchange labour for the income to buy sufficient, nutritious and safe food. The 
Food Security Policy‟s long term goal is to considerably improve food security of 
the population by increasing agricultural productivity, diversity of agricultural 
output and sustainability (Food Security Policy, August 2006). 
 
Contributors to the food crisis debate characterise the food crisis to primarily two 
proceedings in the mid 1990s. Firstly, the breakdown of smallholder farmer credit 
clubs and secondly to the liberalisation of the agricultural markets. The 
breakdown of smallholder farmer credit clubs, together with the abolition of 
fertiliser and hybrid maize seed subsidies, caused farm inputs to become almost 
unaffordable to the poor farmers. To deal with this, the government launched the 
Starter Pack (SP) programme in 1998/9 and the Targeted Input Programme (TIP) 
in 2000/1. However, both the SP and the TIP failed did not live up to the 
expectations of its stakeholders (Chinsinga 2007:5). Both the SP programme and 
the TIP will be discussed more comprehensively later on in the thesis.  
 
One of the worst food security crises in current time occurred in the growing 
seasons of 2000/1 and 2001/2, and was due to unfavourable weather conditions 
and mismanagement of grain reserves. It forced around 30 percent of the 
population (3.3 million people) to require emergency support and on 27
th
 of 
February 2002, former President Dr. Bakili Muluzi announced a national food 
crisis (Cammack et al. 2003:vii). In Malawi, the preferred staple is maize, hence a 
lack of maize is regarded as an indicator of serious food insecurity. After the 
summer harvests in 2001 and 2002, the degree of the food insecurity crisis 
became obvious with domestic requirements not being met (Charman and Hodge 
2007). 
 
 As late as in 2003, Cammack et al. stated that Malawi was clearly in the group of 
nations who were food insecure (Cammack et al. 2003:4).  
 
The problem of food insecurity is extensive, with maize production per capita 
decreasing progressively from 163 kg in the early 1990s to less than 150 kg in the 
late 1990s. In the 2001/2 and the 2004/5 growing seasons, the country 
experienced severe hunger with more than 3.2 million people being affected in the 
season and 4 million in the latter season (Chinsinga 2007:4). These two severe 
crises made the issue of food security an even more politically charged. Especially 
since 2001/2 food security has, as Sahely et al. (2005:17) noted, “appeared in the 
platforms of politicians, on the agendas of policy makers, in the programmes of 
public bureaucracies, among the duties of village chiefs, and on the pages of 
national newspapers (...) and is thoroughly researched and debated”.   
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4.4 Malawi’s (agricultural based) economy  
 
In 1994 Malawi suffered a decline in GDP due to fiscal slippages which were 
attributed to large drought-related expenditures and deferral of inflow from donors 
as a reaction to governance concerns. However, the decline was followed by a 
recovery in 1995 when real GDP rose by 14.3%, mostly due to favourable 
weather conditions that strengthened the performance of the small-scale 
agriculture sub-sector. The favourable weather conditions continued to maintain 
economic activity in 1996 with smallholder agriculture continue to grow strong. 
Besides favourable weather conditions, the good effects of agricultural 
liberalisation began to show. After 1996, the economy slowed down recording 
only a 3.7% growth in 1997, 3.3% in 1998 and rising slightly to 4.2% in 1999. 
The reasons are numerous and include the drought experienced in the 1996/7 
growing season, which was compounded by high input costs, in particular 
fertilisers after the removal of subsidies (O&M Development Consulting 2003:5). 
 
The annual GDP growth rate declined between the years 1990-2000 and only 
accomplished a mean growth rate at around 4% per annum. The macro-economic 
performance of the country during the last decade was influenced by numerous 
factors such as political transformation and climatic conditions. The country then 
experienced episodes of droughts and deteriorating terms of trade (O&M 
Development Consulting 2003:5). 
 
The agricultural sector was the main source of economic growth during the past 
decade. In 1992 and in 1994, the sector declined but came back in 1993 and 1995 
which can be attributed to favourable weather conditions during the 1992/3 and 
1994/5 growing season. Major reforms took place during the last decade which 
included removing fertiliser subsidies, decreasing the role of the public sector in 
agricultural marketing etc. (O&M Development Consulting 2003:6).  
 
The Malawian economy is moderately small with a gross domestic product of 
US$3.6 billion. The average per capita income of the 12.9 million population is 
about US$160. The 2007 Welfare Monitoring Survey, which was released in 
August 2008, measured the poverty headcount at 40 percent. Even though the 
agricultural sector only comprises 35 percent of GDP it is an extremely important 
sector since it makes up more than 80 percent of export earnings and supports 
around 85 percent of the population. Three quarters of the agricultural production 
is produced by smallholders who mainly rely on rain-fed maize production. More 
than 40 percent of the smallholder households cultivate land less than 0.5 
hectares, which means that the distribution of land in the country is rather 
unequal. The main export is tobacco, cotton, sugar, coffee and tea. Since the 
country has produced surplus food during the last three years, the increased 
international food price has not yet affected the country much. Restrictions on 
maize exports have been tightened even more and price controls on the staple 
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have been put in place, though the government claimed that these were only 
temporary (Country overview, World Bank). 
 
Agriculture comprises 39 percent of Malawi‟s gross domestic product (GDP), 83 
percent of the foreign exchange earnings and 85 percent of the labour force, which 
evidently shows that the country depends heavily on agriculture and therefore has 
an agro-based economy. Malawi also relies on support from donors, who 
contribute to 80 percent of the development budget, with official development 
assistance accounting for around 27 percent of GDP. Clearly, the Malawian 
government would not cope that well without support from donors, which 
consequently brings up the question whether it is the government or donors that 
are determining the policy making process and the policies decided (Chinsinga 
2007:3).However, even though this issue is interesting, it will unfortunately not be 
investigated further in this thesis.  
 
The main donors in Malawi are the Department for International Development 
(DFID), World Bank, European Union, Norway, United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the African Development Bank. They 
contribute to around 40 percent of Malawi‟s annual budget and 90 percent of 
development assistance. Other donors are the United Nations agencies such as the 
United Nations Development Programme, World Health Organisation and the 
World Food Programme. Still, the government has taken an active role in defining 
its own development agenda which can be viewed in the Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy (MGDS). The strategy draws out the priorities policies for 
the years between 2006/7 and 2010/11 and identifies that sustainable and strong 
economic growth is the basis for reducing poverty. In order to achieve economic 
growth, six areas of agriculture and food security in the MGDS are emphasised 
(Country overview, World Bank): 
 
(1) irrigation and water development 
(2) transport infrastructure development 
(3) energy generation and supply 
(4) integrated rural development 
(5) prevention and management of nutrition disorders 
(6) HIV/AIDS prevention 
 
The market-oriented approach blamed the food insecurity in Malawi on too much 
government intervention in the agricultural sector. Market liberalisation in Malawi 
(in the agricultural sector) was represented by the removal of subsidies for inputs 
like seeds and fertiliser (Devereux 1997:23). However, the government‟s decision 
to provide subsidies to poor farmers has made Malawi into a major regional 
exporter of food (Anonymous, African Business 2009).  
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5. Case Study: Malawi 
5.1 Subsidies 
 
Agricultural input subsidies were usual in rural economies that were poor during 
the 1960s and 1970s. They were also a key factor in the Asian green revolution. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, conservative policy analysts regarded subsidies as 
inefficient and ineffective as a policy tool in Africa which would only add to 
macro-economic problems and overspending by the government. However, in 
latest years, there has been a revival in the interest of subsidies, especially in 
Africa. The implementation of the large-scale fertiliser and seed subsidy in 
Malawi has gained substantial international attention (Dorward et al. 2008:2).      
 
The Malawian state has preserved a strong influence in cereal market with a state 
marketing board (agency) being predominantly responsible for grain imports. 
Together with Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Swaziland, Malawi has 
retained a centralised grain marketing structure, which means that the government 
has the control, in order to influence price, ensure farmgate sales, consent to pan-
territorial distribution and guarantee household access to affordable staples. 
Tariffs are used with the intention of preventing dumping and protecting local 
production. Malawi has employed more steep tariffs on sorghum, rice and wheat 
flour (Charman and Hodge 2007).  
 
The immense majority of the poor are food deficit small-scale farmers because of 
restricted land availability and poverty. They heavily rely on the low-input 
production of maize on small land plots with deteriorating soil fertility for their 
real income and food security. Their real incomes and capability to buy food are 
thus very vulnerable to maize prices, which alternate radically within and between 
seasons. Over the last ten years, the country has suffered from national food 
shortages because of poor production seasons and dependence on expensive and 
late donor and government funded food staple imports. Consequently, poor 
farmers have been confronted with acute and chronic food insecurity. The 
potential and possibilities with fertilisers and hybrid seeds in order to enhance 
maize production have not escaped the poor farmers; however, acquiring both is 
restricted by supply and affordability constrictions. Since the price of fertiliser is 
high and the price of maize varies a lot, it might lead to a restricted profitability of 
fertiliser use on maize. What this means is that in households where the use of 
fertilisers on maize is the most rewarding, are also confronted with extreme 
„affordability‟ problems. Since these households are usually poor, they do not 
have much cash to purchase the fertilisers, and credit is thought of as risky and 
hard to attain, which is a problem since most bags of fertilisers do not come in 
bags less than 50 kg (Dorward et al. 2008:3). Therefore, I believe that subsides for 
fertilisers were necessary in this situation. 
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5.1.1 Subsidies in the 1990s 
 
In 1992, the Smallholder Agricultural Credit Association (SACA) collapsed and 
in 1995, the Fertilisers Subsidy Removal Programme (FSRP) was completed. 
Subsequently, the smallholders in Malawi were confronted with increased prices 
for fertilisers and relentless restricted access to input credit. Many farmers created 
clubs in order to be able to obtain hybrid maize and fertilisers, but many of them 
failed to repay their loans and broke up. The costs of agricultural inputs have 
persistently increased to more than most farmers could afford after devaluations 
of the Malawian kwacha since the 1990s (Devereux et al. 2007).  
 
In Malawi, Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) were put into practice which 
damaged and in some cases ended commercial farmers and state productivity 
support programmes to smallholders. Further, the SAPs required the country to 
lower the credit and input subsidies, while a smaller amount of resources 
(financial and human) were dedicated to extension, research and technical 
services (Charman and Hodge 2007). With the aim of reducing the impact of the 
SAPs, the Malawian government, with the help of donors, implemented the 
Starter Pack Scheme (SPS) in 1998/9. The underlying idea of it was to provide 
free farm inputs to targeted families, allowing them to conquer their main 
entitlement constraint (input). The targeted families were the resource-poor 
households which included 2.8 million people (Mangisoni et al. 2007:14-15). The 
programme provided enough inputs for 0.1ha of hybrid maize inter-planted with a 
legume crop. Consequently, household food availability was increased. This 
success made the Malawian government consider widening the SPS approach to 
include all smallholder farm families as medium-term food security strategy. 
Though major multi- and bilateral donors contested this, and the World Bank/IMF 
did not consider the SPS as a favourable medium-term strategy. This because they 
acknowledge the necessity of short-term safety net measures, centred particularly 
on individuals and groups in the margin (Charman and Hodge 2007). Two years 
after the start, the SPS was altered to the Targeted Input Programme (TIP), which 
was implemented until the agricultural season of 2004/2005 (Mangisoni et al. 
2007:15). 
 
Since 1993, when the SAP was introduced in agriculture, controversy has existed 
between the IMF and the Malawian government surrounding fertiliser subsidies. 
The agricultural sector in Malawi can be separated into two categories: small farm 
agriculture and large commercial estates, with the former producing around 80 % 
of the food consumed. In the past, the people involved in politics and the 
Malawian population equated food security with corn production. Despite this, the 
SAP aimed at diversifying the agriculture and transforming farmers so that they 
would become more price-responsive. Consequently, the production of food 
grains steadily decreased. Smallholder farmers have for a decade been troubled by 
declining fertility in the soil and not been able to get access to fertilisers. This also 
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caused the maize yields to decrease which meant that many farmers were not 
capable of producing enough to even feed their families. In order to revitalise the 
production of food grains, the government decided to implement the Starter Pack 
scheme in 1999.  Two Starter Pack Schemes were conducted in 1998-1999 and in 
1999-2000, in which farmers were provided with free packs of fertiliser and seeds 
(maize and legume). Both Starter Packs were universally distributing to all rural 
smallholder households, approximating around 3 million. However, due to 
pressure from the IMF and the World Bank, the government had to reduce the 
programme and in 2001 the Targeted Input Programme was introduced. The 
number of people targeted decreased to 1.5 million in 2001 and continued to fall 
to 1 million in 2002. The discontinuation of the Starter Pack programme and the 
unsuccessful targeting under the deluding guidance from donor agencies caused 
severe famines in the coming years. As can be seen from the chart below, there 
was an increase in corn production during the years of the Starter Pack 
programme. In 2000, the high corn production (of 2.5 million metric tonnes), 
meant that the country had a surplus of 350,000 tonnes of maize. After 2001, the 
production of corn decreased sharply.  The enduring low productivity over the 
coming three years after 2001 caused extreme hunger and food shortages, with the 
price of maize increasing, which left millions of people without daily adequate 
meals (Banerjee 2007).  
 
Chart 2. Per Capita Corn Output (in kgs) per year 
 
Source: Banerjee, A. (2007), From Famine to Food Surplus: The Malawi 
Experience, International Development Economics Associates, available 
at: http://www.networkideas.org/news/dec2007/news10_%20Malawi.htm, 
accessed 17 April 2009. 
 
 
 
5.1.2 Fertiliser Programme post 2004 
 
The current fertiliser subsidy programme can be tracked to the electoral campaign 
in 2004, which was characterised by a strong national consensus for fertiliser 
subsidies (Chinsinga 2007:6). This would, according to the author of this thesis 
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signify that the all the politicians knew that the agricultural sector needed to be 
targeted and the production of food increased in order for them to gain support. 
Therefore there was a national consensus for fertiliser subsidies. In early 2005 
after the low agricultural productivity and extreme drought the government, with 
Bingu wa Mutharika as president, decided to reintroduce a more extensive input 
subsidy programme in the 2005/6 growing season, which would target resource 
poor but productive maize farmers (this was later changed to also include tobacco 
farmers). The general purpose of the programme was to provide fertilisers to those 
who had the resources (land), but would have difficulty acquiring it, and not as a 
safety net (Chinsinga 2007:10-12). The programme used a system where vouchers 
(coupons) were handed out to entitled poor farmers, which then purchased seeds 
or fertilisers (for maize or tobacco) in exchange for the coupons. This way it 
included the private sector since the vouchers were valid at eligible shops 
(Mangisoni et al. 2007: 16). The goal was to ultimately achieve food security, 
which is equated to the availability of its main staple maize. The programme was 
later changed to a universal one (Chinsinga 2007:10-12).  As mentioned, 
politicians naturally favour more power than less and know that they need to 
please the masses in order for themselves to maintain power. I believe that by 
making the fertiliser subsidy programme a universal instead of a targeted 
programme, President Mutharika and his government were hoping to gain more 
support, to ultimately gain more power and stay in office. 
 
Around 130,000 tonnes of fertiliser were given out to poor farm households 
though a coupon system. The next year, around 1.5 million poor farm households 
were given coupons in order to purchase fertilisers and two million were given 
coupons for free maize seeds. More than 50% of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food Security‟s budget is assigned to pay the costs of the programme, though 
funds from donors do pay a lot of the costs of the seed subsidy and some 
administrative costs. Combined with favourable weather and goods rains, the 
fertiliser subsidy programme has played an enormous role in increase in maize 
production in 2006 and 2007. According to the World Bank, during the most 
recent harvest, 3.4 million metric tonnes were produced, creating a surplus of 1.2 
million metric tonnes over the national requirement. The surplus was then 
exported to Zimbabwe (400,000 tonnes), Swaziland and Lesotho (80,000 tonnes) 
(World Bank, Malawi, Fertilizer subsidies and the World Bank).     
 
The fertiliser subsidy programme was then launched in the 2005/6 growing season 
and was strongly opposed by certain donors, technical experts and private sector 
leaders. Previous programmes such as the Starter Pack and the Targeted Input 
Programme were not successful in ending the problem of the widespread food 
insecurity (Chinsinga 2007:1). As mentioned, donors were initially sturdily 
against the fertiliser subsidy programme, but their opinions later deviated into 
three categories, those still totally against it, those sceptical but prepared to be 
engaged and those supportive. The two main donors who were totally against the 
fertiliser subsidy programme were the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and US 
Agency for International Development (USAID). Their main contention was that 
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the programme would cause distortions in the market that would make private 
sector development almost impossible. They believed that the most effective way 
to improve agricultural growth was to endorse a market-based approach to input 
provision (Chinsinga 2007:16). Some of the donors that were willing to engage 
even though they were sceptical were the European Union (EU), the World Bank 
and the DFID. These donors are suspicious about the capacity of the government 
and highlight the challenges of targeting. Still, they admit that some sort of 
subsidy might be possible, developed from the lessons learned from the targeted 
input programme. They believe that the subsidies should be appropriately targeted 
at productive and economically active beneficiaries. They too, as the donors who 
were totally opposed to the subsidies, argue in favour of private sector 
development, but agree to subsidies if they do not crowd out private sector 
development (Chinsinga 2007:17).   
 
The ones that were supportive included UN agencies such as the WFP and the 
FAO, as well as local and international NGO‟s. They argued that fertilisers were 
necessary for increasing production and ensuring food security and that 
agriculture in Malawi would not manage without subsidies. They also maintained 
that the subsidies would not distort the private sector since there hardly was one 
(Chinsinga 2007:18). As the FAO office in Malawi stated; “it is much cheaper and 
cost effective to provide an input subsidy than food aid in the face of crisis. At 
least, the people could plant and produce the food that they require. This is much 
more dignified than to perpetually receive food handouts” (IRIN 2007:1). As 
mentioned, the government of Malawi, decided to go through with the subsidy 
programme in spite of what donors thought, which shows that President 
Mutharika and his government wanted to please the citizens of Malawi, and of 
course themselves, instead of solely listening and adhering to donors. With a 
pleased population, they will gain more support and interest from voters, which is 
in line with how the rational choice theory views the behaviour of politicians. 
Maintained by members of the Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and 
Natural Resources, the programme is mistreated by politicians with only members 
of the ruling party the DPP benefiting from it in certain areas. For example, some 
members of Parliament have been accused of writing letters to the Ministry of 
Agriculture instructing them to hand out coupons to people whose names he had 
suggested (Mtawanga 2008). 
 
This group of supporters consent with what Chinsinga (2007:19) calls Sachs-Bono 
position (after economist Jeffery Sachs and artist Bono), which considers 
subsidies as the only way to achieve food security. This is because once farmers 
are able to retrieve fertilisers, good water management and improved seeds, 
developing countries such as Malawi can become food secure.  
 
Even though there were a few shortfalls in the fertiliser subsidy programme, 
Chinsinga (2007:21) considers it reasonably successful. The shortfalls included, 
as criticised by many stakeholders, the use of chiefs and local leaders as keepers 
of the coupons with the argument that it caused prevalent corruption. The chiefs 
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were accused of selling coupons to those who did not necessarily need them. 
Accusations were also made towards the government by the opposition, claiming 
that the government was controlling the coupon system by aiming specifically at 
those areas that were followers to the ruling party. This is a good example of how 
the government behaves for political motives rather than humanitarian. 
Regardless, the effect on the maize yields due to the subsidy programme was 
exceptional. As a result of the programme, Malawi in 2006 had a record maize 
harvest of 2.6 million metric tonnes, which is more than half a million tonnes than 
its yearly requisite of two million metric tonnes (Chinsinga 2007:21).  
 
The subsidy programme was again implemented in 2006/7 growing season, 
though this time with the financial aid of donors, increased participation of the 
private sector in sales of subsidised inputs, and also more alternatives for farmer 
of subsidised maize seed. Several million coupons for fertiliser and seeds were 
budgeted for the 2006/7 programme and then distributed to different districts. 
Farmers purchased fertilisers for around 28% of the full cost, with the government 
chipping in for the rest. In total, 175,000 tonnes of subsidised fertilisers for 
tobacco and maize were sold in exchange for 3.5 million coupons. Barely under 
50,000 tonnes were sold by private companies. The direct costs for the 2006/7 
programme to donors and the government was just below US$91 million, with the 
Malawian government funding 87% of it. Because of the distribution of extra 
coupons, fertiliser sales were 17% over budget, which made the government 
expenditure 25% over their budget. It also has to be taken into account that the 
over-expenditure was already 40% of the Ministry of Agriculture budget and 
more than 5% of the national budget. Since the harvest in 2007 was very good, the 
government determined to export 400,000 tonnes of maize to its neighbour 
Zimbabwe (Dorward et al 2008:4). As can be seen in the chart, in 2006, the 
production started to increase, which can be dedicated to the implementation by 
the government of the Fertiliser subsidy programme.  
Chart 3. Corn Production (mn Metric Tonnes) per year 
 
Source: Banerjee, A. (2007), From Famine to Food Surplus: The Malawi Experience, 
International Development Economics Associates, available at: 
http://www.networkideas.org/news/dec2007/news10_%20Malawi.htm, accessed 17 April 2009. 
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In 2007, the population of Malawi was 13 million, and with this the country 
required the production to be more than 2 million metric tons of grain per year in 
order to be self-sufficient in food. In each of the last two years, this goal was 
attained. As can be seen in chart 2, Malawi was able to go back to being self-
sufficient in per capita corn production (Banerjee 2007). 
 
Official evaluation of the 2006/7 programme recognised several benefits. The 
maize output was increased with the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
(MoAFS), which approximated the total maize production to 2.7 million tonnes in 
2005/6 and to 3.4 million tonnes in 2006/7. Both of these harvests broke new 
records and were significantly larger than the 2004/5 growing season when the 
production was estimated at 1.2 million tonnes. The price of maize, as is assumed 
after a large harvest, was low following the 2005/6 growing season; however, 
after the 2006/7 prices were considerably higher which insinuates that the 
production of maize was overrated. However, the favourable weather with good 
rains in both years indicated that not all the production increase can be credited to 
the subsidy programme. There was an 8% increase in the economic wellbeing of 
the rural households‟ in May/June 2007 compared to 2004, according to their own 
subjective rankings. In the 2006/7 programme the participation of the private 
sector in fertiliser and seed retail sales was enhanced. This increased the optimism 
and also permitted partial financial recovery (Dorward et al. 2008:4). According 
to me it is important that the people involved in the private sector are also 
satisfied with the government‟s strategy to becoming food secure, since even 
though they might be a minority, their votes and support is important for the 
government.  
 
A cost-benefit analysis of the programme in 2006/7 demonstrated that effects are 
greatly sensitive to external conditions and management. Thus the programme 
could generate positive economic returns together with good management. The 
programme could not be validated only on its involvement in decreasing 
government spending on food imports in the years where the production has been 
poor. This is because there are alternative ways to secure and obtain price 
stabilisation and grain supplies that might be more effective and efficient than 
implementing a subsidy programme. Execution of the programme does not seem 
to have had undesirable impacts on budgetary distributions to other sectors and 
the macroeconomic stability; however, the demands for staff on both local 
governments and on the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security have impinged 
on the provision of other services. The influences on the social protection (the 
welfare and pliability) on the poor households consisted of an increased level of 
food self-sufficiency amongst deficit producers, increase quantities of marketed 
maize made the price decrease which was to benefit of food purchasers, increased 
employment (both farm and non-farm) and increased wages. All these benefits 
and advantages are crucial for the rural people in Malawi in the context of 
alleviating extreme poverty, dependence on low-productivity maize production, 
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vulnerability and food insecurity. Though it must be mentioned that such benefits 
from the 2006/7 programme were sadly weakened and challenged by the high 
maize prices in 2007/8, as a consequence of exports encouraged by overestimates 
of the production and stock of maize (Dorward et al 2008:4).   
 
5.1.3 Discussion for improvement 
 
Knowledge from the programmes in 2005/6 and 2006/7 imply that there are 
significant possibilities for Malawi to make the outcomes of the programme 
better. However, considerable dangers exist if action to develop the programme‟s 
effectiveness and control its costs does not occur, dangers that include the 
programme becoming an indefensible and unsustainable strain on resources. 
These risks and dangers would then probably be aggravated by the increases in 
international prices of fertilisers (Dorward et al. 2008:5). This could also then 
have repercussions for domestic politics.  
 
There are several key issues within the programme that need attention though. An 
inclusive and coherent framework of objectives is essential in order to determine 
possibly contradictory purposes, and to permit suitable targets and budgets to be 
appointed for both short and long term strategies. More attention is required on 
putting the programme within broader national and agricultural development 
strategies. Problems come up with price and maize market policies, social 
protection programmes and policies, in agricultural research and in investments in 
rural roads. If the interferences in the maize market result in increased domestic 
prices (as happened with the export of maize in 2007/8), it could significantly 
weaken and damage the positive impacts such as food security, rural economic 
growth and social protection of the subsidy programme. The lack of agricultural 
research and poor infrastructure reduces the effectiveness of the programme; 
therefore sufficient resources need to be allocated to these areas so that the 
programme can become more cost-effective so that it does not take resources from 
other investments needed. In 2006/7, household and national-level approximates 
propose that between 30-40% of the subsidised fertilisers bought displaced 
commercial procurements instead of adding to total purchases. Displacements like 
that weaken the viability of the private sector and shifts sparse government funds 
to less poor farmers with only moderate developmental benefits from the 
programme. However, by more effectively targeting the subsidies to poor farmers, 
and helping them plan their commercial purchases, there could be a positive 
correlation between household wealth, land holding and displacement. Each year 
both the prices of inputs and the scale of the programme has increased and 
resulted in growing fiscal outlays and costs (Dorward et al. 2008:5).    
 
The programme is one of the key items in the country‟s national budget and 
therefore it is vital to ensure that it does not override the budget too much. Since it 
is one of the key items, the government relies much on the outcome of the 
programme for its support. However, in all three years that the programme has 
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been executed, it has exceeded the budget, due to physical input distributions and 
price overruns. Increases in the scale of the programme will most probably cause 
enhanced displacement and thus also cause diminishing returns along with rising 
costs, especially in the circumstances that now exist with rising international 
prices of fertilisers. Therefore the cost and scale of the programme has to be 
regulated. There are vital gaps in the information that thwart effective 
management and planning of the programme, including different estimates 
between the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and the National 
Statistical Office. Therefore, reliable information on smallholder production and 
of national stocks, consumption and flows of staples are crucial for food security 
policy. The private sector‟s involvement has increased, though it has the ability to 
supply greater quantities in the future if the government would allow it to. This 
would also increase its feasibility and permit the government to decrease the costs 
of the programme (Dorward et al. 2008:5).    
 
5.1.4 Reasons for success 
 
The debate over whether the success is truly due to the success of the programme 
or should be ascribed to favourable weather conditions remains. According to 
Chinsinga (2007:21), the prevalent view is that the success of the maize harvest 
was due to the fertiliser subsidy programme implementation, and not to 
favourable weather conditions. This has been strongly propagated by the 
government and donors who were supportive of the programme and subsidies in 
general in order to find a viable mean to revitalise agriculture in Africa.  
 
Dorward, et al. (2007:5), tried to present a pilot analysis of the effects of the 
2005/6 fertiliser subsidy programme. The analysis maintained that the incremental 
use of fertilisers on maize as a consequence of the subsidy in 2005/2006 was 
approximated to 45,000 tonnes. This, together with good weather conditions, 
made the record maize harvest possible. An association and contrast was made 
with the 1999/2000 growing season when the Starter Pack was in use and Malawi 
produced a 2.5 million metric tonne harvest. This again was also accompanied 
with favourable weather (good rains). The conclusion made by this analysis was 
that the maize production was positively affected by the subsidy programme, as 
was the livelihoods of the people. According to the author of this thesis after 
having researched the issue it is a successful mixture of both.  
 
With the maize production in 2005 being 1.7 million metric tonnes, records were 
broken in the following years with maize productions in 2006 with 2.7 million 
metric tonnes and in 2007 with 2.3 million metric tonnes, increased output turned 
around Malawi‟s food deficit.  Until very recently the country was depending on 
the United Nations World Food Programme to feed its population. Because of 
record maize production, Malawi was able to supply the World Food Programme 
with 400,000 tonnes of maize, aiding their neighbour Zimbabwe. Arindam 
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Banerjee (2007) claims that this is a lesson for all policy makers in Africa who 
deal with the issue of food security, since he credits the turnaround to the 
government policy intervention, by reintroducing the subsidies for fertilisers as 
part of the 2005 Fertiliser Subsidy Programme. The programme started in 2006, 
though expanded in 2007, with the government handing out coupons to farmers 
with low incomes in order to make it able for them to buy fertilisers at 
approximately one-fifth of the market price. Coupons for seeds, sufficient for 
planting on half an acre, were also made available for low-income farmers. 
Consequently, the mean yield of farmers increased from 0.8 tonnes per hectare to 
two tonnes.  The programme has, according to Banerjee (2007) cost the 
government $62 million, which is about 6.5% of its whole budget. The 
implementation of the programme was systematically contested by economists 
and donors, who maintained that reintroducing subsidies for fertilisers would 
make the budget deficit worse, create distortions in the market, and would not 
make the economy any more efficient. However, their arguments did not hold 
tight when there evidently was an increase in the corn production, which made the 
country save $120 million, money which it had spent of importing food aid in 
2005. By selling maize to neighbouring countries, Malawi earned another $120 
million. The brave decision taken by the government of Malawi to go against 
donor opinion and break away from the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
for agriculture by the IMF has proven, according to Banerjee (2007), that here is 
no one model to tackle the issue of food security that fits everyone.  
 
However, some economists and donors do not acknowledge that the increase of 
food grains is due to the fertilizer subsidies, but simply accredit it to favourable 
weather conditions. The United States ambassador in Malawi claimed in an 
interview that, “The plain fact is that Malawi got lucky last year... they got 
fertilizer out while it was needed. The lucky part was that they got the rains” 
(Celia W. Dugger, The NY Times, Dec. 2 2007).  
 
Banerjee (2007) maintains that this view on the situation is naive and it cannot be 
credited to good rains. The argument is strengthened by the claim that the yearly 
rainfall data (see table 1 below) shows that during 2001 Malawi in fact received 
the most rain in almost a decade, though this was the year that the food shortage 
first occurred. He maintains that the severe decrease in corn production in 2001 
(see chart 3) concurred with the dismantling of the Starter Pack programme. 
However, in 2000 when there was a production surplus of corn, there rains were 
poor, and in the next three years (the first three years of the so called hungry 
period), Malawi experienced more rains than in 2000. The modest rains that 
occurred in 2004 and 2005 made the famine even worse in the countryside, 
adding to the disastrous consequences of bad policies. According to Banerjee, 
without the government implementing the fertiliser subsidy programme, the last 
few years of rain would have gone to waste.    
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Table 1: Annual Rainfall: Malawi 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Rainfall (mm) 37,523 39,104 28,322 42,705 33,910 33,950 26,440 25,427 
Source: Department of Meteorological Services, Malawi 
 
After the evident success of the subsidies for fertilisers the World Bank still 
claimed that the Malawian government did not have a plan for how and when they 
eventually would abolish the subsidies. But for policymakers, civil society groups 
and the general population of Malawi, it has hard to understand why they should 
abolish one of the most successful economic programmes ever (Banerjee 2007). 
According to the author of this thesis, the government wants the success story to 
continue in order to maintain its power, because with the programme being a 
success and the public benefiting from it, credit will be given to the government in 
the form of support and re-election in the upcoming elections. This behaviour 
demonstrates and strengthens the argument of politicians acting according to the 
rational-choice theory pointed out earlier. 
 
It must be noted that maize production is concentrated to a few districts in the 
country, with a few districts being food-insecure due to smaller harvests 
(Devereux et al. 2007).  
 
The Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) utilises coupons to supply a 
partial subsidy and to target its beneficiaries. The beneficiaries are poor farmers 
who have the land and human resources to utilise the fertilisers in an efficient 
way. However, the interpretation of who can be a beneficiary is rather open to 
local traditional authorities. The role of the local traditional authorities was 
reduced by the government for the 2007/8 growing season, in order to make the 
programme more transparent (Africa Research Institute 2007).  
 
 
5.1.5 Climate 
 
As mentioned, many sources have attributed the success of the fertiliser subsidy 
programme to favourable weather conditions. Therefore I find it necessary to give 
the reader an overview of the climatic situation in Malawi.  
Bad and unfavourable weather conditions can be extremely damaging when the 
levels of poverty are high, making it hard for producers to protect themselves 
against risks through means such as irrigating land or insuring against losses. 
Though weather conditions can have an impact on all sectors of an economy, the 
influence on agriculture is often comparatively larger (Thomas 2006:42). Even 
though the country has a big body of water in the form of Lake Malawi, the 
agricultural sector still depends on rain-fed agricultural production. Therefore the 
climatic conditions have a major influence on agricultural production, hence also 
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economic growth since, as mentioned, the majority of people and the economy 
relies on the agricultural sector (O&M Development Consulting 2003).  
 
Malawi‟s climate is sub-tropical with one rainy season from November to May 
and the dry season being from May to November (SADC, Malawi 2008). 
During the rainy season in 2007/8, the government put the fertiliser subsidy 
programme into action again, which was directed at 1,8 million smallholder 
farmers. The fertiliser subsidy programme, together with favourable weather, 
triggered record maize harvests in 2006 and 2007 (with a surplus of over 1 million 
tons in 2007). Out of the surplus, 90,000 tons were bought by the WFP at a cost of 
more than US$20 million, which used the record amount of food obtained within 
the country as well as for other operations in southern Africa. The 2008 harvest 
was not predicted by the WFP to be as large, which could intensify the pressure 
on the poorest and most vulnerable, who always struggle to access adequate food. 
(http://www.wfp.org/countries/malawi). 
 
Rural households almost fully depend on rainfall for their livelihoods. Since the 
rainfall in the country is unpredictable and inconsistent, it puts farmers, especially 
poor ones, every year at the risk of flooding or drought within each growing 
season. The inconsistency in maize production, according to Devereux et al. 
(2007), is mainly due to erratic rainfall. Even though maize production is 
generally increasing, the coefficient of variation has risen since the early 1990s. 
Food security is therefore threatened by the unpredictable rains and harvests 
(Devereux et al. 2007:24). 
 
In 2009, the majority of the country has had persistently good and well-distributed 
rains to maintain the development of crops. Yet the amount of rainfall overall 
decreased in comparison to past months. The rains in February also allowed for 
the planting for tubers that are planted after the other crops. Periods of sunshine in 
between the rains in February were advantageous for the growth and development 
of maize and other crops. Because of good weather conditions until now during 
this season, together with the enhanced use of hybrid seeds and fertilisers, the 
production of crops this season are predicted to be more than the previous season, 
given that the favourable weather conditions continued through to late March. 
However, the prospects are not good in all districts. In three of the country‟s 
districts the poor performance of the rains will most likely result in bad harvests. 
Except for these three districts, the country overall, as mentioned, has had good 
rains, even though there have been dry spells which have not affected the 
production predictions. It was even predicted in February 2009, by USAID, that 
farmers in the central and northern areas would probably even receive harvests 
that would exceed last year‟s production (FEWS, Feb. 2009). However, as stated 
in the report on Malawi‟s food security by the Famine Early Warning Systems 
Network and USAID, “Rainfall performance will be critical for a favorable 
production outcome” (FEWS, Feb. 2009, p.3). 
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5.2 Malawi’s Political Situation  
 
This section will illustrate how the government, politicians and opposing parties 
act, events that have occurred and the policies that the implement in order to 
obtain food security, focusing on the years after the latest election in 2004. Some 
of the events illustrated might not directly be connected to agricultural policies 
however, I think that it is important to convey for the reader what the politicians 
are like. It is to show the reader the underlying motives of their behaviour, which 
in my opinion is a mixture of wanting to maintain power and acting in their own 
interest, which connects back to what I was writing about earlier in the theoretical 
part of the thesis. In addition to this, it reflects why the government chooses to 
implement certain policies, which would in the case of Malawi be agricultural 
policies, since they are the most important because it is an agricultural based 
country. When reading this section, one shall note that the political culture in 
Africa is different from the political culture which is known to the people from 
countries of long democratic rule. 
  
In 1994, President Hastings Kamuzu Banda was succeeded by Bakili Muluzi of 
the United Democratic Front (UDF) in an election that was by and large perceived 
to be fair and free. In 1999, he was re-elected. Instead of amending the 
constitution and candidate again for presidency, Bingu wa Mutharika was 
specially selected as his successor for the presidential elections in 2004, which he 
won with 35 percent of the vote with the aid of his anticorruption campaign. In the 
beginning of 2005, a disagreement between Mutharika and former president 
Muluzi, who was the chairman of the UDF, escalated. The main reason was the 
arrest of numerous influential UDF individuals who were a part of Mutharika‟s 
anticorruption election campaign. This caused Mutharika to leave the UDF and 
formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Soon after, accusations that 
public funds had been utilised to draft legislators to the DPP were made and the 
members who had changed parties after the election would lose their seats 
because it was against the constitution to do so (Freedom House 2007).  
 
In June 2005, the newly formed government, with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
decided to pass the „Food and Nutrition Security Policy‟. The overall goal of the 
policy was to considerably enhance the food and nutrition security of the 
population. It stated, as many other documents have done, that the food insecurity 
situation in Malawi was due to many factors including poor infrastructure, chronic 
poverty, low agricultural growth, bad economic policies etc. It was also 
recognised that these factors were all interrelated and all contributed to food 
insecurity, though the main cause was the chronic poverty in the country. Chronic 
poverty in Malawi is due to the deficiency of economic opportunities to either 
produce enough nutritious and safe food or to trade labour for income to be able 
to purchase enough food. The policy further recommends good governance as a 
key factor in guaranteeing that public systems and institutions benefit and protect 
everyone. The good governance clause states that a “strong political leadership 
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and commitment is necessary for development interventions to have an impact on 
wealth creation leading to poverty reduction.” (Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security, „Food and Nutrition Security Policy‟, June 2005, p.3). With passing this 
policy, the government is safeguarding itself for re-election since as stated a 
strong political leadership and commitment is necessary, and obviously Mutharika 
and his government show that they are committed by simply passing such a 
policy. 
 
In the policy, the government further states that it is dedicated to make sure that 
no actions of the government or private traders would decrease the access to safe 
nutritious food for any Malawian, and that there should be no discrimination in 
the purchasing or selling of food (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, 
„Food and Nutrition Security Policy‟, June 2005). The main objective of food 
security is to “guarantee that all men, women, boys and girls, especially under-
fives in Malawi have, at all times, physical and economic access to sufficient 
nutritious food required to lead a healthy and active life.” (Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food Security, „Food and Nutrition Security Policy‟, June 2005, p.7).  
The policy further goes on to describe the detailed strategies on how Malawi 
would ensure sustainable food availability, sustainable access to food, proper food 
utilisation, stability in food and nutrition, food and nutrition information systems, 
monitoring and evaluation.  
According to the United Nations Development Programme, Malawi is an 
emerging democracy which has made many strides. It has a strong constitution, a 
remarkable set of constitutional bodies, such as the Parliament, the Anti-
Corruption Bureau, the Human Rights Commission, etc. All the Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections (in 1994, 1999, 2004 and local government elections in 
2000) have been concluded as fair and free; however, they exposed several 
weaknesses in the electoral regime that will have be mended if elections are to 
benefit the general populace. According to me this is not a good sign for a rather 
new democracy, especially if it is the case that the government and president 
Mutharika wants to stay in power since, with a weak democracy, elections can 
more easily become flawed. As maintained by the UNDP and which I agree with, 
good governance is critical for national development (UNDP 2009), which should 
be the ultimate goal for a poverty stricken country.   
The country is an electoral multi-party democracy, with the president being 
directly elected to five year terms. According to the Freedom House (2007) and in 
accordance the UNDP, elections are in general free form obvious manipulation; 
however, recent elections have been characterised by irregularities. In January 
2007 the government decided to delay the local elections to 2009, which initially 
had been planned for 2005. For me this should be taken very seriously since in a 
free and fair democracy, elections should not be delayed for this long. As 
indicated by the Freedom House, political division are most commonly founded 
on personality and ethnoregional loyalties, instead of policy (Freedom House 
2007). In Staffan I. Lindberg‟s The Power of Elections (2004), it is mentioned that 
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the more agrarian a society is, the more likely it is that people vote for the 
representatives that they believe are good „patrons‟ of their constituency or 
community. He also highlights that there is much more emphasis on the person 
instead of the party, which in my view can be the case with Malawi‟s president 
Mutharika who most likely has gained many votes with the success of the 
fertiliser subsidy programme and his anticorruption campaign. These issues are 
something that one has to have in mind when looking at politics in Africa.  
(Lindberg 2004). Sporadic political violence by party thugs or policy has occurred 
during election periods. Two UDF officials were arrested and charged in January 
2007 with agitation after the recording in which president Mutharika supposedly 
called for undetermined action against the former president Bakili Muluzi. The 
same year in April, a UDF rally was interrupted by military forces sent out by the 
government (Freedom House 2007).  
As mentioned before, Malawi‟s development budget is supported by donors with 
up to 80 percent, and therefore a good relationship with them is necessary. Since 
Mutharika became president, the relation with donors has improved, even if 
donors at first were opposed to the government reintroducing subsidies for 
fertilisers. Because of impressive improvements in agricultural output the country 
attained growth rates of an estimated 7.9 percent in 2006 and 5.7 percent in 2007. 
Therefore the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank decided to 
offer Malawi a $3.1 billion in total nominal debt relief (Freedom House 2007).  
Fighting corruption is one of Mutharika‟s main priorities (apart from also 
increasing the agricultural production in the country). The opposition has accused 
the effort of being specifically targeted at them however people within the 
government have also been affected and convicted, which demonstrates that it‟s 
not solely the opposition which is targeted. Even though both the IMF and the 
World Bank approved of debt relief in 2006, they maintained that the country had 
not succeeded in making substantial progress on corruption (Freedom House 
2008). This of course weakens Mutharika‟s government since his campaign and 
much of his staying in power has been focused on fighting corruption and 
increasing agricultural production.  In the Transparency International‟s 2007 
Corruption Perceptions Index, Malawi ranked 119 out of 180 countries (Global 
Corruption Report 2008).  
According to Africa Research Bulletin (2008 Vol.45), the public in Malawi has 
become used to talks of assassinations and treasons against President Mutharika, 
whose leadership is seen as volatile and unpredictable. Several events such as 
arrests of UDF officials and sympathisers in April 2006 before the visit of 
Zimbabwe‟s President Mugabe, and the arrest and charge of Vice-President 
Cassum Chilumpha for attempted murder and treason, have made the public 
scepticism increase. The President‟s former party, the UDF, has been the 
government‟s key target for a long time. All of the UDF‟s senior members have 
either broken away from the UDF to join Mutharika‟s DPP, or been accused of 
corruption or disloyalty. Former President and current UDF Chairman Muluzi was 
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surrounded in his own home by heavily armed police for four days without any 
charges. This, according to me, shows that the government both acts in their own 
private interest and in order to remain in power, which illustrates that the rational-
choice theory is applicable here.  
As maintained by the Africa Research Bulletin (2008 Vol.45), the current 
government, and many of the donors, act as if the economy is their only 
responsibility. Over the past three years the country has done this well with maize 
surpluses, decreased public debt etc. However, what the government and donors 
must not forget is that development and food security it not only about increasing 
the food production, but also enhancing the availability and accessibility for the 
poor people. The success has to trickle down to the whole population.  
In agreement with many others, the Africa Research Bulletin (2008 Vol.45), 
indicates that the parliamentary democracy in Malawi is unstable and fragile. In 
June 2008, because of the government‟s inability to negotiate in good faith with 
the leaders of the opposition, the National Assembly was deadlocked. The May 
2009 general elections were put into jeopardy in 2008 when the presidential 
candidate Muluzi was arrested and detained without any charges. The Africa 
Research Bulletin further maintains that Mutharika‟s government gradually 
utilises soldiers and the armed forces more and more against demonstrations that 
are peaceful. Furthermore, they uphold that Mutharika has never had much time 
for Parliament and that he thinks that serious debate is not possible because he 
considers the majority incapable and against him and his visionary plans for 
development. It seems as though he presumes that promises can be made and 
broken in the Parliament in order to obtain approval of his appointments and 
budget (Africa Research Bulletin June 2008 Vol.45).  
In February the former President and Mutharika‟s main opponent in the upcoming 
presidential elections appeared in court on February 26
th
, 2009. He has been 
accused by the country‟s Anti-Corruption Bureau of taking $11 million from 
donor money, but maintains that he is innocent. The authorities claim that there 
are no political motives behind the case. However, Muluzi was forced to 
relinquish his passport in order to receive bail (Africa Reseach Bulletin, 2009 Vol. 
46). Through his defence, Muluzi is reported to have informed the court that the 
corruption case against him should be dropped since he believes that it is only a 
political interference by the government. However, the judge ruled out what 
Muluzi claimed. The former president also received bad news from Malawi 
Electoral Commission (MEC) that he could not stand in the coming presidential 
elections in May 2009. The Constitutional Court also ruled out Muluzi‟s 
application for re-election as President, stating that he already had served the two 
five-year terms allowed. Media reports in Malawi sustained that in the beginning 
of April 2009, Muluzi joined forces with Malawi Congress Party (MCP), led by 
John Tembo (Banda Jr. 2009).   
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Freedom of the press is legally ensured, even though there are sporadic 
restrictions, and the newspapers in Malawi present an assortment of different 
opinions. The state owns the bulk of all broadcast media, and its pro-government 
partiality decreased after Mutharika became president. However, in 2007, 
problems with the freedom of press appeared after threats of disciplinary action by 
the broadcasting regulator towards a private radio station who had aired an 
unfavourable recording of the president (Freedom House 2007). The conversation 
was apparently between Kaliwo, the former Director of the Anti-Corruption 
Bureau who was discharged, and President Bingu wa Mutharika, the day before 
the arrest of Mulizi in July 2006. One voice which could have been Mutharika‟s 
proposes to the second voice, perhaps Kaliwo‟s, that Muluzi, who was not named 
but unmistakably identified ought to be „„shaken up‟‟ and taken to court. The 
recording could have been regarded by the government as an incident created by 
the opposition party UDF. However, the seriousness with which the government 
took it suggests, according to African Research Bulletin (2007 Vol.44), that 
Mutharika is moody and supersedes the autonomy of the law-enforcement 
agencies (Africa Research Bulletin 2007 Vol.44). After this incident, the 
information minister ordered the regulator to ban all live airing private radio 
stations unless it has been approved by the government.  The action was aimed at 
three stations that had been dealing with the rallies that were pro-Muluzi.  Later 
the same year, a private TV station owned by the former president was ordered of 
the air as they were accused of broadcasting propaganda, though the parliament, 
which is controlled by the opposition, denied that they provided state-owned 
outlets with financial support (Freedom House 2007). Freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press are two vital instruments of a well-functioning democracy, 
therefore the actions by the government towards the press is worrying.  
 
5.2.1 Agricultural and Food Policies 
 
After having described the general political situation, which can be considered 
rather tense, I want to further highlight what the government specifically has done 
with the agricultural sector and what, if anything, the tense political situation 
means for food policy. 
 
A lot of people expected that in 1994 when the one-party rule ended in Malawi, it 
would lead to social development and economic recovery. However, the process 
of democratisation concurred with the intensifying crisis in the agricultural sector. 
The country went from producing an agricultural surplus in the 1970s to being 
food deficient in the 1990s with per capita maize production falling considerably. 
Food insecurity therefore then became widespread. Around 70-80 percent of 
households in the rural areas are without self-produced staple foods for about four 
to five month per year. The severity of the crisis was emphasised by two 
occurrences of severe hunger during the growing seasons of 2001/2 and 2004/5, 
which made food security a highly charged political issue (Future Agricultures, 
Feb. 2008).  
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In May 2009, the fourth Parliamentary multiparty and Presidential election will 
take place. The current President Bingu wa Mutharika will represent the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which was formed in 2005 after the 
President separated from the United Democratic Front (UDF) despite the fact that 
he gained his presidency with the UDF in 2004. Even though Malawi has a 
challenging political environment, Mutharika‟s administration has managed to 
establish policies and strategies that are generally seen as helping turn around the 
economy (The World Bank, Country overview).  
 
Since independence, the Malawian government has associated the production of 
maize with national food security (Devereux 1997:8). In 1990, the Malawian 
government acknowledged the importance of food security for the overall 
development of the country and formulated the „Food Security and Nutrition 
Policy Statement‟ as a supplement to the DEVPOL („Statement of Development 
Policies 1987-1996‟). The main goal of the „Food Security and Nutrition Policy 
Statement‟ was to enhance the food security and nutritional status of all 
households in the country by attaining growth through poverty reduction (O&M 
Development Consulting 2003:13). 
 
In 1995, the government created the Agricultural and Livestock Sector 
Development Strategy and Action Plan. The main aim of the plan was to provide 
a comprehensive statement of aspirations for the agricultural sector. The action 
plan and strategy was based on alleviating rural poverty with participation as a 
principle. The strategy suggested a policy, institutional, legislative and investment 
framework that would create a competitive, secure, stable and rewarding milieu 
for enhanced and sustainable agricultural production and improved food security. 
However, a follow up review was carried out in 1999 which investigated the 
strategies and policies set out in the document from 1995, which recognised 
numerous limitations to the implementation of the strategies. The review found 
that food security was a cross-cutting issue with respect to the agricultural sector 
since it relates to a decreasing agricultural productivity, increasing population and 
intensified poverty (O&M Development Consulting 2003:22-23). 
Since the agricultural sector continued to have problems, the government, through 
the Malawi Agricultural Sector Investment Programme, prepared the agricultural 
sector priority policies and strategies framework in 2001. The framework, by 
analysing the issues and limitations, recognised ten major/priority public 
expenditure intervention areas that would bring about a more productive 
agricultural sector, as well as reduce poverty. These were: access to inputs, land 
management and soil fertility management, management of disease and insect 
pests outbreaks, development of research technologies for smallholder farmers, 
provision of basic agricultural infrastructure, extension services, agricultural 
diversification, capacity building for agricultural related institutions, 
strengthening linkages, and mainstreaming of gender, HIV/AIDS and 
decentralisation issues (O&M Development Consulting 2003:24). 
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The Malawian government viewed the food crisis and famine as a message to 
sustain farmer support programmes. Subsidies were reintroduced for resource-
poor smallholders by applying the targeted inputs approach. The subsidy 
programme allowed Malawi to recover fast from the famine by lengthening the 
cropping season (by supplying inputs for winter cropping) (Charman and Hodge 
2007). 
 
As mentioned, in the May 2004 elections the UDF won and formed a government. 
The general expectation after the election was that the government would directly 
reduce the price on fertilisers as they assured that they would during their 
campaign. Yet this did not occur and the government took a long time to 
formulate a concrete and clear fertiliser policy. Instead of implementing a 
universal fertiliser subsidy programme which was expected, the government 
decided in August 2005 to continue with the TIP but on a larger scale. The 
expanded version of TIP (ETIP), reached out to 2.1 million farmer households, 
which was a major increase from the 1.5 million who were targeted in the TIP. 
The uncertainty of the farmers who were not targeted further increased when the 
government told them to wait until the government had set the definite price of 
fertilisers. The ambiguity surrounding the government‟s decision whether to 
employ a universal fertiliser subsidy programme or not had two major 
consequences for the 2004/5 growing season. First, the private sector did not 
know when to order fertilisers, which led to scarcity on the market for the farmers 
who could afford to purchase them at market price. Second, the inputs from the 
ETIP arrived late because of the lengthy time it takes to import the fertilisers. As a 
consequence the distribution was postponed and in many cases completed when 
the maize had developed beyond the critical stage for the application of fertilisers. 
Together with the brutal drought in the 2004/5 growing season a serious hunger 
crisis developed which affected around 4 million people in Malawi. It was 
contended that the government might have hesitated to instigate a universal 
fertiliser subsidy programme because they were afraid that they would not reach 
the completion point for debt relief of the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper. The 2004/5 hunger crisis strengthened the debate about the reintroduction 
of a fertiliser subsidy programme. The government was criticised by advocacy 
groups and opposition parties for not keeping the promise that they made during 
the 2004 campaign. The president left the UDF and formed his own party, the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and since the DPP did not have much 
representation in parliament and leaving the UDF which had helped him to 
presidency significantly made the political situation very tense in Malawi 
(Chinsinga 2007). 
 
The conflict and power struggle, which began in February 2005 between 
Malawi‟s two prime leaders, President Bingu wa Mutharika and his forerunner 
Bakili Muluzi, has been damaging to the poverty-stricken people of Malawi. The 
political tension in the country has increased remarkably.  The government is 
accusing the Vice President Cassim Chilumpha and Yusuf Matumula of 
conspiracy to assassinate Mutharika and commit treason. Just before the arrest, 
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Mutharika proclaimed that Chilumpha had resigned from his position because he 
had not attended numerous cabinet meetings; in addition to this, he was also 
accused of running a parallel government. This led to a long court battle, but 
ultimately Chiumpha was reinstated as Vice President of Malawi. The general 
public in Malawi believe that the continuous political court battles are a factor in 
the accumulation of court cases causing overcrowding in the prisons. According 
to the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation, the court disputes between the 
two leaders and its supporters are costing the country a lot of money which is 
payed by the tax payers. The conflict between the two leaders and their parties 
does not bode well for the democracy in the country. In his new year‟s speech, 
Mutharika let loose his rage on journalists and members of the judiciary, accusing 
them of scheming with the opposition in order to take down his government. 
Furthermore, Mutharika advised that he would execute unspecified action against 
Muluzi in order to silence him. Noel Mbowela, a political analyst, asserts that the 
political tension and conflict between the two are detrimental for the country‟s 
democracy and development agenda. Mbowela also suggests that instead of 
uniting the population of the country, its population is being divided because of 
the two leaders (Semu-Banda 2007). With the government focused on in-fighting 
and endless court cases, critical programs like fertilizer subsidies and other 
agricultural development measures get less funding and less attention. Thus, the 
continued battle for power places an additional strain on Malawi‟s food security. 
 
In the 2004 presidential elections all the most important candidates made policy 
commitments to subsidise fertilisers. In 2005, the national maize production was 
low due to the late distribution and restricted scope of the targeted input 
programme for the 2004/5 growing season, which was exacerbated by  
unfavourable weather (poor rains). Together with sluggish emergency response 
and official importation measures, the low production resulted in high maize 
prices and critical food shortages in 2005/6. Subsequently in the 2005/6 growing 
season the government initiated an all-encompassing input subsidy. The 
objectives of the subsidy were to improve the access to and use of fertilisers in 
both maize and tobacco production, and in that way enhance food security and 
agricultural production.  Because of the lack of trust between the government and 
the private sector relating to the 2004/5 input subsidy programme, the distribution 
was now conducted solely by parastatals (corporations that are partly or wholly 
owned and controlled by the government). The subsidy was executed by the 
allocation of coupons for four different types of fertilisers, which the beneficiaries 
could exchange at parastatal outlets at around one-third of the normal price. The 
criteria for the selection of recipients of coupons varied locally and so did the 
amount of people who were given coupons, and the number of coupons given to 
each household. The two parastatals sold 131,000 tonnes of the subsidies 
fertilisers. The direct costs of the programme, funded by the government, (without 
the overhead costs), was stated to be MK7.2 billion (Malawian Kwacha), even 
though the budget was MK5.1 billion. The private sector reported in 2005/6 that 
sales of fertilisers were substantially inferior to the sales in the previous years due 
to their exclusion from the programme and lower commercial sales. Numerous 
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chains of the main private sector fertiliser distribution also stated that they had 
experienced financial shortfalls as a consequence of the same cause as noted 
above. These problems were especially grave for a substantial part of the small-
scale independent agro-dealer network. A gradual increase in use of fertilisers on 
maize as a consequence of the subsidy was assessed to be just over 100,000 
tonnes, which together with good rains brought about a record harvest (Dorward 
et al. 2008:3).  
 
5.2.2 National Fertiliser Strategy 
 
In October 2007, the government and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security passed the „National Ferstiliser Strategy‟, which acknowledged that there 
was no complete fertiliser policy which points out detailed national objectives and 
goals. This of course makes it more difficult for both the private and the public 
sector. The idea for the strategy was to attain high levels of agricultural 
productivity, which would be achieved by increasing and improving the 
availability, affordability and utilisation of fertiliser. This will be done by 
continuing the fertiliser subsidy programme however, this is seen as a short-term 
measure. The National Fertiliser Strategy presents the government with ways to 
intervene in the level of prices paid for fertilisers in the fertiliser market by 
farmers. A pan-territorial fertiliser retail price will ensure that farmers purchase 
fertilisers at the same price no matter what social status, season or location they 
are at. Consequently, the accessibility and affordability of fertiliser for poor 
farmers would increase. However, the country‟s infrastructure, such as the road 
network, needs to be improved in order for the programme to work at its 
maximum capacity. Improving the physical flow of fertilisers would enhance the 
agricultural production even more. According to the National Fertiliser Strategy, 
the main role of the government would be to focus its resources and efforts on 
targeting beneficiaries and regulation of the fertiliser act. In areas where the 
market has completely failed, the transportation and distribution of fertiliser 
would be the responsibility of the government as well, through state run delivery 
system (National Fertiliser Strategy, 2007).   
 
5.2.3 Agricola Medal 
 
In November 2008, Malawi‟s president Bingu wa Mutharika received the 
Agricola medal from the Food and Agriculture (FAO). The Agricola medal is 
given to leaders who carry out measures to eliminate hunger and is the highest 
distinction of the FAO to distinguish personal determination and support to 
encourage agriculture (FAO Newsroom 28 Nov. 2008).  Jacques Diouf, Director-
General of the FAO, stated that it was because of Mutharika that Malawi has 
become known as a success story even though there are immense challenges of 
increasing food and energy crisis. Diouf further pointed out that the medal to 
Mutharika should be considered as a direction and support for other countries 
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facing alike obstacles to food security and development. Mutharika contended that 
it was a common effort by Malawians to take control over the situation (Malawi 
News 30 Nov. 2008). At the 2003 Maputo African Heads of State and 
Government Conference, the attending Ministers decided that a minimum of 10 
percent of budget allocations should be to the agricultural sector. As Diouf 
pointed out, Malawi was one of the few countries which managed and ever 
surpassed this agreement, allocating a great 16 percent to the agricultural sector 
(FAO Newsroom 28 Nov. 2008). 
 
5.2.4 Transferability to other countries 
 
Implementing subsidy programmes similar to Malawi‟s in other countries can be 
risky and they have to comprehensively recognize the benefits and objectives. 
They also have to establish if it is possible to achieve the stated objectives given 
the degree and nature of household vulnerability, poverty, available food and 
input markets. Possible benefits then have to be considered in comparison with 
the opportunity costs of resources assigned to the programme, especially 
investments in long-term food staple productivity growth. The risks of failure 
involving issues such as high international fertiliser costs and bad or uncertain 
weather conditions due to the global climate change also need to be taken into 
account. However, it is crucial to note that input subsidies should not be 
considered as a fast fix for coping with high food prices Vital and superseding 
principles in their implementation and design ought to be that they result in 
increased access to and productive utilisation of inputs by smallholder farmers 
(Dorward et al. 2008:6).  
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
The issue of food security has been discussed in this thesis, with emphasis on the 
case of Malawi, a landlocked and extremely poor country in southern Africa. 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world and in spite of that they 
managed to obtain national food security. 
 
By implementing subsidy programmes for fertilisers and seeds, the government of 
Malawi managed to increase the agricultural production output which meant that 
they obtained national food security, and also had a surplus of food which they 
exported to neighbouring countries. Donors were at first very skeptical of the 
subsidies, but the Malawian government decided to go through with them 
anyway. The subsidy programmes were targeted at the poorest farmers, and the 
handouts were given out by local chiefs. This has been criticised since local chiefs 
might favour people, and therefore this needs to be improved in later programmes.    
Bingu wa Mutharika was elected President in 2004 and was handpicked by the 
former President, who is now one of Mutharika‟s opponents due to Mutharika‟s 
leaving the party which helped him to win the presidency. This caused a lot of 
political tension to flare up at the same time that the political battle between the 
two heated up, Mutharika implemented the subsidy programme. According to me, 
this was in order to gain support to be re-elected in the upcoming elections in 
2009. Since the majority of the people live in rural areas, it is important that these 
people are satisfied with their situation. This is what, according to me, Mutharika 
is doing, satisfying their needs, in order to gain their support.   
 
The subsidy programme is far from perfect and the country has many issues that it 
has to further deal with including the bad infrastructure which decreases the 
effectiveness of the programme. Transferring the programme to other countries 
who are food insecure might work, but one has to keep in mind that every country 
is unique and there is not any „one-fits all‟ model. It also has to be mentioned that 
the sustainability of the programme can be questioned.  
 
The research question put forward in this thesis was; How and Why did Malawi 
manage to become food secure. After gathering a multitude of literature and 
analysing it, the author would conclude that Malawi obtained national food 
security because of the successful subsidy programme that was implemented after 
the latest election in 2004 when Bingu wa Mutharika was elected President.  
What the author of this thesis has tried to convey to the reader is that Malawi 
managed to become food secure with the government deciding to reintroduce 
fertiliser subsidies however, food security has become a positive bi-product of the 
government‟s and the presidents will to maintain power and act in their own 
private interest, which is in accordance with what the rational choice theory 
argues.  However, one must also be critical and ask the question whether it is 
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sustainable to subsidise fertilisers and seeds for poor farmers. Further research 
could of course be conducted into the issue, which would give more insight into it 
and also how other countries could also become food secure by adopting similar 
policies to Malawi‟s.   
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